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Privatization Schedule

*Miranda Institute (in formation) · Venezuela Multi-Sector Intelligence · Edition: August 3, 2026 ·
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Privatization Schedule — State-Owned, Seized & Concession-Candidate Enterprises

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A working, progressively-expanded reference to the enterprises that are candidates for privatization or restitution — whether originally state-created or expropriated/seized/occupied. Built incrementally from credible sources (Transparencia Venezuela, Poderopedia/IPYS, Armando.info, trustworthy journalists, and the Gaceta Oficial); the Source column names the source organization as a label (the underlying address is held on file and omitted here to keep the chart compact and uncluttered). Columns: Enterprise · Size/measure · Location · Status & original-owner note · Source. Where the original private owner is known, a restitution/expectation note is included; “state-created” marks firms the state built (privatization, not restitution). Figures are best-available estimates and are refined as new sourcing appears. This annex supersedes any in-line company list previously contemplated for a prior Headlines item.

Scope counters (Transparencia Venezuela): ≈900+ state-owned enterprises identified; ≈440+ expropriated/confiscated since 2000; ≈53% with public corruption/mismanagement denuncias. The entries below are a curated, sourced subset, expanding each cycle.

Restitution-law track — the Cedice bill (new this edition): the legal architecture this schedule ultimately depends on has taken draft form. Cedice Libertad has presented an anteproyecto of a Ley Orgánica de Restitución, Devolución de Activos y Garantía de la Propiedad Privada — six chapters and 21 articles — ordering the restitution of state-taken private assets to their legitimate owners or legal successors, with economic compensation where physical return is impossible (the routes and financial instruments are set in its article 11). The scope matches this schedule’s universe: Cedice’s Observatorio de Derechos de Propiedad counts ≈2,500 companies and agricultural production units taken by the state through expropriation, estatización, or invasion — with ≈2,740 property-rights violations documented in 2005–2014 alone — most of them, in the organization’s framing, “**vías de hecho**” rather than lawful expropriations (no public-utility declaration, no payment). The draft takes Nicaragua, Chile, and Hungary as reference restitution experiences, and gerente general Rocío Guijarro has said Cedice will introduce it in the National Assembly for legislative consideration. For readers of this schedule the bill is the prospective rulebook for every “**restitution/expectation**” note below; the four-posture restitution framing and compensation architecture live at the Transition (Return of Invaded Homes and Commercial Premises to Their Legitimate Owners) and the Democracy agenda (Property Restitution & Expropriation Compensation). Sources: El Estímulo · Infobae · El Nacional.

Disposition note — not all candidates are immediate outright sales. Many of these assets are paralyzed, decapitalized, or operating far below capacity, so selling them in current condition would crystallize a depressed value. For such cases the transition could use interim operating agreements, management contracts, or leases (with capex and performance obligations) that let a private operator restore the asset to full operation and fair value first, deferring an eventual outright sale to a better moment — capturing the recovery upside for the State (or the restitution pool) rather than selling at the bottom. The “**stay-and-adapt**,” concession-first electricity (C.11), and strategic-alliance models already in use are precedents. The disposition column flags where a lease/operating-agreement bridge is the more sensible path than an immediate sale.

A.1 — Agri-food & Agribusiness

Agropatria (ex-Agroisleña; agro-inputs retail/distribution; National network (≈80+ outlets); Nationwide (HQ Caracas)) — Expropriated 2010 from Agroisleña (Spanish-owned, Fernández family) and renamed Agropatria — the two names are the same company before and after the seizure. ≈half the stores reportedly handed post-2017 to a private “strategic alliance”

(Grupo Agrollano/Eveba, Khalil Majzoub brothers) under comodato. Original-owner (Agroisleña) restitution claim live (TalCual). Lácteos Los Andes (dairy; Multi-plant; pre-seizure a national dairy leader; Cabudare (Lara) + plants) — Expropriated 2008; output collapsed after 2013; reported 2020 Iranian-group “alliance” to revive. State-created/seized hybrid (Poderopedia/IPYS). Industrias Diana (oils/fats; National edible-oils producer; Valencia (Carabobo) area) — Expropriated 2008; productivity decline documented (Poderopedia/IPYS). Café Fama de América (coffee; Major coffee roaster/brand; Caracas + roasting plants) — Expropriated 2010; ties to the Coffee-Law rebuild (prior Headlines; Poderopedia/IPYS). Bio Aloe / Caigua aloe (sábila) processing (Caigua plant ≈2 t/day (Nov 2025), ≈10 t/day target; Caigua, Simón Bolívar mun. (Anzoátegui)) — State agroindustrial aloe-vera operation (gel/cosmetic/industrial; EU export); part of the state sábila program (cf. Sabilven, Falcón, 2012). Delcy Rodríguez inspected Bio Aloe ≈late May 2026. State-created (AVN · Últimas Noticias). Cargill de Venezuela (food processing; Rice/pasta/flour plants; Multiple (incl. portuguesa/central)) — Rice/agro plant seized 2009 (Cargill, U.S.); restitution/compensation claim context (Portafolio). Hato El Charcote (Agroflora / Vestey; Cattle ranch, ≈32,000 ha (≈13,000 ha occupied); Cojedes) — British-owned Agroflora/Vestey Group estate; one of the first high-profile land “rescues” (2005). Idle/occupied. Restitution claim context (Transparencia Venezuela). Hato Piñero (and Branger-family estates; Cattle ranch + biodiversity reserve, ≈80,000 ha; Cojedes) — Large private ranch/ecotourism estate affected by Land-Law intervention. To be detailed (Transparencia Venezuela). Agropecuaria Flora / La Marqueseña (Azpúrua; Cattle/agricultural estate, ≈8,000+ ha; Barinas) — Seized 2010 (expropriation decree); productivity decline. Restitution claim (Poderopedia/IPYS). Hatos of Apure (Agroflora cluster; Several cattle ranches, tens of thousands of ha; Apure) — Cluster of seized/occupied ranches along the Colombian border; many idle or under INTI/Agrofanb control. Itemize estate-by-estate as Gaceta Oficial sourcing firms up (Transparencia Venezuela). Agrofanb / INTI consolidated estates (Aggregated seized farmland (millions of ha cumulatively “rescued” since 2001); Nationwide (Guárico, Barinas, Portuguesa, Apure, Zulia)) — The state agricultural-land pool assembled under the 2001 Land Law; much idle or underproductive. The umbrella under which individual restitution claims and re-tendering would be adjudicated (Transparencia Venezuela).

A.1.1 — Sugar Mills (Centrales Azucareros) — itemized

Central Azucarero Pío Tamayo (Sugar mill; El Tocuyo (Lara)) — Seized; handed to a private consortium under comodato; unresolved worker labor-liability disputes (Transparencia Venezuela). Central Santa Clara (CAAEZ-related; Sugar mill; Aroa / Yaracuy area) — State-managed sugar mill; chronic underproduction. To be detailed (Transparencia Venezuela). Central Azucarero Portuguesa (CAP; Sugar mill; Portuguesa) — Mixed state/private history; production well below capacity. To be detailed (Poderopedia/IPYS). Central Río Turbio (Sugar mill; Lara) — State sugar program; underutilized. To be detailed (Transparencia Venezuela). Central Azucarero Carora / Trujillo & Barinas mills (Sugar mills; Lara, Trujillo, Barinas) — Cluster of state-program/seized mills; labor-liability conflicts a recurring re-privatization obstacle. Itemize individually as sourcing firms up (El Carabobeño/Reuters).

The sugar-mill cluster is split into individual cases above and expanded each cycle; the binding obstacle across most is the unpaid worker labor-liability (pasivos laborales) the state recognizes but has not paid, which deters concessionaires.

A.2 — Industrial, Metals, Minerals & Materials

CAMIMPEG — Compañía Anónima Militar de Industrias Mineras, Petrolíferas y de Gas (50-year mandate, >50 authorized activities across mining, oil & gas services; coltán alliance in Arco Minero Area 1 (2019); Caracas HQ · Arco Minero del Orinoco operations) — State-created by the military: Decree 2,231, G.O. 40,845 (Feb 10, 2016), adscribed to the Defense Ministry, 5-member board named by the Defense Minister; Dec 2020 statute change concentrated powers in its president; Control Ciudadano documents no public accounts rendered since creation; restructuring/wind-down candidate — its mining role would return to civilian operators under license. Restitution note (partially verified): analysts document the use of army logistics, equipment, and personnel in its commercial operations (Revista SIC); a specific inventory of heavy

machinery diverted from the Army Engineering Corps to the gold-mining zones could not be independently verified this cycle — carried as an audit objective: any Engineering Corps machinery so diverted should be identified and returned to the Corps, where it is acutely needed for post-earthquake reconstruction (the Transition (Applying for Multilateral Credit Facilities)—Earthquake Recovery; Control Ciudadano · Revista SIC · Gaceta Oficial). Sidor (steel; Integrated steelworks; pre-seizure >4 Mt/yr, now <15% utilization; Ciudad Guayana (Bolívar)) — Re-nationalized 2008 from Ternium/Techint (Argentine-Italian); ICSID settlement (≈\$1.97B) history. CVG cluster. Restitution partly negotiated (Poderopedia/IPYS). Siderur (steel — long products; Rolling mills / long steel; Multiple (incl. Barquisimeto, Casima)) — Expropriated 2010 from Sivena group; CIADI/arbitration history. Restitution claim context (Poderopedia/IPYS). Sivena (steel/holding; Steel holding / downstream; Bolívar / national) — Expropriation context (Siderur parent); CVG-adjacent (Poderopedia/IPYS). Alcasa (aluminum; Primary aluminum smelter; Ciudad Guayana (Bolívar)) — State-created (CVG); operating far below capacity; Caroní-power dependent. Lease/operating-agreement candidate pending power restoration (Poderopedia/IPYS). Ferrominera Orinoco (iron ore; National iron-ore miner; pre-decline ≈20 Mt/yr; Ciudad Piar / Ciudad Guayana (Bolívar)) — State-created (CVG); the upstream feed for the whole steel chain; output collapsed. Concession/operating-agreement candidate (Transparencia Venezuela). Venalum (aluminum; Primary aluminum smelter; pre-decline ≈430k t/yr; Ciudad Guayana (Bolívar)) — State-created (CVG); minority Japanese consortium history (bought out); idle/low utilization; Caroní-power dependent. Lease-then-sell candidate (Poderopedia/IPYS). Bauxilum (bauxite/alumina; Bauxite mine + alumina refinery; Los Pijiguaos & Ciudad Guayana (Bolívar)) — State-created (CVG); upstream feed for Venalum/Alcasa; underutilized. Sequenced with the aluminum smelters (Poderopedia/IPYS). Carbonorca (carbon anodes; Calcined-carbon anode plant; Ciudad Guayana (Bolívar)) — State-created (CVG); the critical anode input for aluminum reduction — its rehabilitation gates any Venalum/Alcasa restart (Poderopedia/IPYS). Fesilven (ferrosilicon; Ferrosilicon producer; Ciudad Guayana (Bolívar)) — State-created (CVG); idle/low utilization (Transparencia Venezuela). Maderas del Orinoco / MAVETUR (forestry; Uverito plantation ≈600,000 ha (Caribbean pine/eucalyptus/acacia); Sur de Monagas/Anzoátegui) — Proforca (1975) → Maderas del Orinoco S.A. → 2019 restructured into MAVETUR S.A. (51% state / 49% Glenmore, registered Turkey — reportedly Saab/Pulido-controlled per Armando.info/Correo del Caroní). ≈8,000 ha lost to fires; exports shifted to low-value wood chips. Likely JV-unwind + transparent re-tender of Uverito. Accountability via the separate Registry (Armando.info · Correo del Caroní). Cemex Venezuela (cement; One of three major cement producers; Multiple plants) — Nationalized 2008 from Cemex (Mexican); ICSID history; national cement output ≈12 Mt → <3 Mt/yr. Restitution context (Portafolio). Holcim / Lafarge Venezuela (cement; Cement plants; Multiple) — Nationalized 2008–10 from Holcim (Swiss) and Lafarge (French); negotiated-settlement category (Portafolio). Envases Venezolanos (Owen's Illinois) — glass (Two glass-container plants; Valera (Trujillo) & Los Guayos (Carabobo)) — Expropriated 2010 from Owens-Illinois (U.S.); ICSID award (≈\$372M, later reduced). Restitution/compensation claim (Portafolio). Fertinitro (petrochemical — fertilizers; Nitrogen-fertilizer complex; Jose (Anzoátegui)) — Expropriated 2010; foreign minority owners (Koch, others) — ICSID arbitration history (Poderopedia/IPYS). Smurfit Kappa Venezuela (paper/packaging; Forestry + paper/packaging plants; Multiple (incl. Portuguesa)) — Seized 2018 from Smurfit Kappa (Irish); restitution claim live (Portafolio). Tidewater (oil-services marine; Offshore supply vessels / marine base; Lake Maracaibo (Zulia)) — Vessels/assets seized 2009 (Tidewater, U.S.); ICSID award (≈\$46M+) history (Portafolio). Helmerich & Payne (oil-services drilling; Drilling rigs (≈11); Western/eastern oilfields) — Rigs idled then effectively seized 2010 (H&P, U.S.); arbitration/claim context (Portafolio).

A.3 — Energy, Oil & Power

CORPOELEC (electricity; National power utility; Nationwide) — State-consolidated 2007; the LOSSE reform (prior Headlines) opens the sector. Unbundling/concession candidate, not single-owner restitution (Transparencia Venezuela). ConocoPhillips (Orinoco projects; Petrozuata/Hamaca/Corocoro stakes; Orinoco Belt; Gulf of Paria) — Stakes seized 2007; ICSID/UNCITRAL awards (≈\$8.7–11B+). Largest single expropriation-compensation claim. Negotiated-settlement track (Portafolio). ExxonMobil (Cerro Negro; Heavy-oil project stake; Orinoco Belt) — Seized 2007; ICSID award (reduced

on annulment). Partially-settled/negotiated category (Portafolio). Total / Equinor (Sincor; Heavy-oil project stakes; Orinoco Belt) — French/Norwegian stakes seized 2007; Equinor settlement context (≈\$266M). Negotiated category (Portafolio). Crystallex (gold — Las Cristinas; Gold concession; Bolívar) — Concession revoked 2008/2011 (Crystallex, Canadian); ICSID award ≈\$1.4B; CITGO/Delaware enforcement litigation (Portafolio). Gold Reserve (gold/copper — Brisas; Brisas/Las Cristinas-area concession; Bolívar) — Concession revoked (Gold Reserve, U.S./Canada); ICSID award (≈\$770M) and CITGO-enforcement role (Portafolio). AES — EDC / La Electricidad de Caracas (Caracas-region power utility; Caracas) — Nationalized 2007 from AES (U.S.); negotiated-settlement category; folded into CORPOELEC (Portafolio). Domegas / domestic LPG (propane-butane) distribution (Bottled-gas (bombona) distribution network; Nationwide / regional) — State/PDVSA-Gas-linked domestic LPG (propano-butano) distribution; chronic bombona shortages and black-market premia (cf. Democracy C.21 LPG tariff). Distribution-concession candidate; private/cooperative operating-agreement model the likely path (Transparencia Venezuela). Mibiturven (bitumen / extra-heavy; State bitumen company (Faja-orbit); Orinoco Belt / Zulía) — State entity for natural bitumen / Orimulsión-type extra-heavy resource development; largely dormant. Restart/JV candidate sequenced with the LOH-reform and upgrader tracks (Transparencia Venezuela). Hidrocapital (and regional hidrológicas; Metropolitan water utility (Caracas + Miranda/Vargas); Caracas region) — State water utility; system capacity collapsed (cf. Democracy C.64 water tariff). Revenue-sharing / operating-concession candidate (water concessions are standard in the region; Transparencia Venezuela). Satellite service (VENESAT / ABAE orbital assets; State satellites (VENESAT-1, VRSS-1, VRSS-2) + ground stations; National (ABAE)) — State space-agency satellite/telecom service built under Chinese cooperation; ground stations and orbital assets. Revenue-sharing / operating-partner candidate (and an audit/security-review subject, cf. Democracy C.33; Transparencia Venezuela).

“Stay-and-adapt” operators that remained (e.g. Chevron, Repsol, ENI, Shell) are not restitution claimants but are tracked here because their contracts and stakes interact with the privatization and LOH-reform tracks.

A.4 — Telecom, Utilities & Transport Services

CANTV / Movilnet (telecom; National fixed + mobile incumbent; Nationwide (HQ Caracas)) — Nationalized 2007 from Verizon-led ownership (≈\$572M settlement); aging Chinese-supplied infrastructure. Privatization candidate (Section 04; Portafolio). Conferry (Consolidada de Ferrys, C.A.; Main mainland–Margarita ferry line (Puerto La Cruz / Cumaná ↔ Isla de Margarita); fleet largely out of service; Nueva Esparta / Anzoátegui / Sucre (eastern coast)) — Privately owned operator taken over / intervened by the state amid financial collapse and fleet decay, leaving Margarita’s main maritime lifeline crippled. Restitution-claim context; strong operating-agreement / concession candidate to restore the route before any eventual sale (cf. disposition note; Poderopedia/IPYS). Conviasa (state airline; National flag carrier; National (HQ Maiquetía)) — State-created airline; OFAC-sanctioned 2020 (delisting/compliance review needed). Restructuring/strategic-partner candidate as aviation reopens (Transparencia Venezuela). IPOSTEL (national postal & logistics; National post office + municipal real-estate footprint; Nationwide) — Decayed state postal operator; UPU standing, philatelic base, near-universal property footprint. Revenue-sharing / logistics-concession candidate with a national address-database build mandate (Democracy C.14; Transparencia Venezuela). El Metro de Caracas (urban mass transit; Multi-line metro + rolling stock; Caracas metropolitan area) — State-operated (C.A. Metro de Caracas); decayed fleet/stations, partial service. Long-term operation-and-rehabilitation concession candidate (Santiago/Lima/São Paulo models); assets state-retained, fares regulated with low-income protection (Transparencia Venezuela). IFE — national train system (inter-city rail; Rail corridors (Caracas–Cúa operational; Tinaco–Anaco ≈70% built; others stalled); National) — State rail authority (Instituto de Ferrocarriles del Estado); mostly stalled/incomplete. Build/rehabilitate-operate-transfer concession candidate packaging operational + unfinished segments (Transparencia Venezuela). PDVSA/state gas-station network (service stations; National fuel-retail network (thousands of estaciones); Nationwide) — State-controlled fuel retail; tied to the fuel-pricing reform (Democracy C.62). Retail-concession / franchise-privatization candidate (Transparencia Venezuela). Hilton Caracas / hotels (hospitality; Hotel assets; Caracas;

Margarita) — Hotel expropriations (Hilton chain assets); restitution context (Portafolio).

A.4.1 — International Airports & Ports (concession / operating-agreement /

State-operated transport infrastructure — strong concession candidates (revenue-generating, clear KPIs, deep global precedent). Disposition: long-term concession / operating agreement / revenue-sharing with assets state-retained during the transition; cross-ref Democracy C.73.1.

Aeropuerto Internacional de Maiquetía (Simón Bolívar; Primary international airport; Vargas/La Guaira (serves Caracas)) — State-operated (BAER); the country's main gateway. TSA assessed it in 2026 for the aviation reopening. Lead airport-concession candidate (Transparencia Venezuela). La Chinita Int'l (Maracaibo) · Arturo Michelena Int'l (Valencia) · J.A. Anzoátegui Int'l (Barcelona) · Gen. José Tadeo Monagas (Maturín) · Del Caribe (Porlamar/Margarita) · Jacinto Lara (Barquisimeto) · Juan Vicente Gómez (San Antonio del Táchira) · Josefa Camejo (Punto Fijo; Regional international airports; Zulia, Carabobo, Anzoátegui, Monagas, Nueva Esparta, Lara, Táchira, Falcón) — State-operated; under-maintained. Concession/operating-agreement candidates; itemize terminal-by-terminal as sourcing firms up (Transparencia Venezuela). Puerto Cabello (Largest seaport (container + bulk); Carabobo) — State-operated (Bolipuestos); the country's principal cargo port. Port-terminal concession candidate (ISPS re-certification needed; Transparencia Venezuela). La Guaira · Maracaibo · Puerto La Cruz/Guanta · Guaranao · El Guamache (Margarita; Seaports; Vargas, Zulia, Anzoátegui, Falcón, Nueva Esparta) — State-operated (Bolipuestos); concession/operating-agreement candidates (Transparencia Venezuela). Orinoco river ports — Puerto Ordaz, Matanzas, Palúa (River/industrial ports (iron ore, bauxite, steel); Ciudad Guayana (Bolívar)) — CVG-linked; serve the mining-industrial complex; concession sequenced with the CVG reactivation (Democracy C.21; Transparencia Venezuela).

A.4.2 — Main Bridges & Highways (operation / toll / maintenance concession

Trunk road infrastructure suited to toll-backed operation-and-maintenance concessions (cross-ref Democracy C.73). Assets state-owned; concessionaire operates, tolls, and maintains.

Autopista Regional del Centro (ARC; Caracas–Valencia expressway, ≈110 km; Miranda/Aragua/Carabobo) — Highest-traffic trunk corridor; degraded. Lead toll-concession candidate (Transparencia Venezuela). Autopista Gran Mariscal de Ayacucho (Caracas–Guarenas/Guatire–Barcelona; Miranda/Anzoátegui) — Eastern corridor; partial deterioration. Concession candidate (Transparencia Venezuela). Autopista José Antonio Páez (Central-west llanos corridor; Cojedes/Barinas/Portuguesa) — Agro-logistics corridor; maintenance backlog (Transparencia Venezuela). Autopista Valle–Coche / Francisco Fajardo (Caracas urban; Caracas metropolitan expressways; Caracas) — Urban arterials; toll-concession feasibility study candidate (Transparencia Venezuela). Puente General Rafael Urdaneta (Lake Maracaibo bridge; ≈8.7 km lake bridge; Zulia) — Strategic Zulia link; structural-maintenance priority; toll-concession candidate (Transparencia Venezuela). Orinoco bridges — Angostura (1967) & Orinoquia (2006; Major river crossings; Bolívar) — Operation/maintenance concession candidates (the third Orinoco crossing, Caicara–Cabruta, is a completion project — Democracy C.73; Transparencia Venezuela). Viaducto La Cabrera / Caracas–La Guaira (Caracas–Litoral; Mountain viaducts to the coast/airport; Aragua; Vargas) — High-traffic; the Caracas–La Guaira system serves the Maiquetía airport and port. Concession candidate (Transparencia Venezuela).

A.4.3 — State Media (public-service-media restructuring

State-owned broadcast, radio, and print outlets. Disposition for most is NOT a commercial sale but conversion into an independent Public Service Media structure (the proposed Democracia TV (civic) and Valores Venezuela TV (cultural) networks, with RNV transferred in — see Democracy C.75); a few commercially viable outlets could be privatized. Distinct from the seized-private outlets (A.7) and the corruption-network media (A.6).

VTV — Venezolana de Televisión (National state TV; National) — The flagship state broadcaster; public-service-media restructuring (governance/editorial-independence overhaul), not commercial sale (Transparencia Venezuela). teleSUR (Multistate pan-regional TV/digital; International) — Venezuela-led multistate network; restructuring/divestment of Venezuela's stake; editorial-independence overhaul (Transparencia Venezuela). TVes (National public TV (on the ex-RCTV spectrum); National) — Created 2007 on RCTV's seized frequency; spectrum-return question (cf. RCTV, A.7) plus public-service restructuring (Transparencia Venezuela). ViVe TV (National cultural/educational state TV; National) — State cultural-educational channel; candidate to fold into the new public cultural network (Valores Venezuela TV; Transparencia Venezuela). ANTV — Asamblea Nacional TV (Legislative-channel TV; National) — The parliamentary channel; core candidate to be converted into the new public-affairs/civic network (Democracia TV) — see Democracy C.75 (Transparencia Venezuela). Radio Nacional de Venezuela (RNV) — entire network (National public radio network; National) — All RNV channels — RNV Informativa, RNV Musical, RNV Clásica/Cultura, RNV Indígena, RNV Activa (Deportes) — plus regional RNV stations (Zulia, Táchira, Anzoátegui, Portuguesa, Los Llanos, and others). Proposed transfer into the new Public Service Media corporation (Democracia TV / Valores Venezuela TV), preserving rule-of-law and best-practice public broadcasting (Transparencia Venezuela). YVKE Mundial (National AM/FM radio network; National) — State radio network; public-service-media restructuring candidate (Transparencia Venezuela). La Radio del Sur (International/state radio; National/intl) — State radio outlet; restructuring/divestment candidate (Transparencia Venezuela). Correo del Orinoco (National daily newspaper; National) — State daily under the Ministry of Communication & Information; part of the government media system. Public-service restructuring or wind-down; title/assets reviewed for continuation as a transparent public-record outlet vs. closure (Transparencia Venezuela). Ciudad CCS (Municipal free daily; Caracas) — Founded by the Caracas (Libertador) municipality, publicly funded, distributed free; municipal-media restructuring candidate (governance/editorial independence) under a reformed Caracas municipal framework (Transparencia Venezuela).

A.5 — Finance (State-Owned Banks)

Banco de Venezuela (Largest state commercial bank; Nationwide) — Nationalized 2009 from Santander (Spanish); GL 57 banking thaw (prior Headlines). Lead privatization candidate (Section 04, C.5; Portafolio). Banco Bicentenario del Pueblo (State universal bank; Nationwide) — State-created/merged from several intervened banks; privatization candidate (Transparencia Venezuela). Banco Digital de los Trabajadores (State digital bank; Nationwide) — State-created; GL 57-covered (Transparencia Venezuela). Banco de Comercio Exterior (Bancoex; State foreign-trade bank; Caracas) — State development bank; restructuring candidate (Transparencia Venezuela). Banco de la Fuerza Armada Nacional (BANFANB; Military-affiliated bank; Caracas) — State/military-affiliated bank; governance-review and restructuring candidate (Transparencia Venezuela). Seguros Horizonte (military insurer; State insurance company (FANB-linked); Caracas) — Insurance company tied to the military (IPSFA/FANB orbit); covers military personnel and state assets. Privatization/restructuring candidate; governance review given the military-affiliation and any contract-steering exposure (Transparencia Venezuela). Intervened/failed private banks (2009–2010 crisis) — Banco Federal, Baninvest, Banco Canarias, Banco Confederado, Bolívar Banco, BanPro (Defunct/intervened commercial banks; National) — A cluster of private banks intervened and liquidated in the 2009–2010 banking crisis (some owners — e.g. Arné Chacón, Ricardo Fernández Barrueco — prosecuted); residual assets, branches, and recovery estates remain under FOGADE/SUDEBAN. Asset-recovery and re-tender candidates rather than going concerns (Transparencia Venezuela).

A.6 — Acquisitions by Government-Aligned Figures Under Investigation

Distinct category: assets that were bought, taken over, or leased by businessmen aligned with the government who are under investigation (U.S. and/or Venezuelan) for allegedly using funds of corrupt origin. Inclusion reflects documented investigations/allegations from credible sources — not a finding of guilt — and these assets carry layered claims (the

corruption-proceeds dimension runs through the separate confidential Accountability Registry). Treatment in any transition will need to distinguish a legitimate purchase from a laundering vehicle.

Universe (INRAV Venezuela Loot Tracker, built with Transparencia Venezuela and the Corruptómetro): as of March 2026 the U.S. Department of Justice had opened ≈80 forfeiture cases against Venezuelan officials and associates tied to the Chávez and Maduro networks, with money involved totalling on the order of \$3.9–4B in forfeiture orders, concentrated in five states — Florida (the plurality), Texas, New York, Connecticut, and Missouri — over case-years 2009–2025 (≈60 resolved, ≈23 ongoing). The largest case clusters are the CLAP food-import network (Saab/Pulido and associates, ≈\$1.6B, S.D. Fla., ongoing), ex-national-treasurer Alejandro Andrade (≈\$1.0B, resolved), the Saab/Pulido FX-bribery case (≈\$363M), and ex-treasurer Claudia Díaz Guillén (≈\$137M). This U.S.-court case backbone is the recovery pool the proposed PANA-Act Venezuela Restoration Fund would channel (prior Headlines), and the asset rows below are the enterprise/property subset of that universe; the broader cross-jurisdiction tally (≈719 assets, 21 countries, ≈\$3.9B) sits in Section 04's recovered-asset item, and individual accountability sits in the separate confidential Accountability Registry.

Globovisión (TV news channel; National news broadcaster; Caracas) — Bought 2013 for ≈\$68M; funds alleged to derive from Raúl Gorrín's corruption/FX schemes. Gorrín under U.S. DOJ (S.D. Florida) money-laundering indictment and OFAC SDN (Jan 8, 2019); Transparencia Venezuela maps a ≈29-company / "68 corruption-link" network. Gorrín reportedly captured in VZ Feb 2026 (Transparencia Venezuela · INRAV · Infobae). El Universal (newspaper; Historic national daily (founded 1909); Caracas) — Sold July 2014 for ≈\$90M to opaque Spanish shell Epalisticia (capital €3,500; owner Tecnobreaks Inc, Panama) — origin of funds never disclosed; since ≈2020 Globovisión's owners (Gorrín/Perdomo circle) assumed administrative/editorial direction. Foreign ownership of VZ newspapers is itself legally questionable (IPYS Venezuela · Runrunes). Banca Amiga / Gorrín-network financial vehicles (Commercial/investment banking; Venezuela; offshore (DR, Panama, etc.)) — Banking/insurance vehicles (incl. Seguros La Vitalicia; an alleged Dominican-Republic bank acquisition with banker Gabriel Jiménez) reportedly used in the Gorrín FX-arbitrage/laundry scheme per U.S. charges and Transparencia Venezuela. Allegation-stage; specifics to be firmed up (Transparencia Venezuela · INRAV · Infobae). Notitarde / regional media (Gorrín circle; Regional newspaper; Valencia (Carabobo)) — Reported acquired ≈2021 via Gustavo Perdomo (Globovisión president), same network. Allegation-stage (Reporte de la Economía). Colegio Jefferson (bilingual school; Private bilingual K-12 school; Valle Arriba, Baruta (Caracas)) — Reportedly appropriated by José Simón Elarba (Fospuca owner) — along with Bancamiga, Bangente, and ≈14 other companies — exploiting the incommunicado detention of owners (Rafael Perdomo / De Grazia circle) in the PDVSA-Cripto case. Elarba's own bio reportedly lists ownership. Allegation-stage; victims' denuncias (El Pitazo · Armando.info). Bancamiga / Bangente / Compass Bank (De Grazia banks; Commercial + digital banking (Bancamiga: 1M+ accounts; infra valued >\$500M by owners); Caracas; Dominica (Compass)) — The De Grazia brothers' banks; the brothers were arrested April 2024 in the PDVSA-Cripto case (Bancamiga alleged to have custodied FX for PDVSA-linked oil resale under El Aissami). The banks reportedly then "passed to" José Simón Elarba / Carlos Erik Malpica Flores (Cilia Flores's nephew) — a contested seizure the De Grazias call expropriation under coercion; no formal SUDEBAN evidence presented per their complaint. Layered allegations on multiple sides (WLRN · TalCual).

A.7 — Consumer/Pharma Exits & Other (voluntary departures under deteriorating

Companies that exited voluntarily as conditions deteriorated — not expropriations, but assets/plants that may re-enter under the transition and whose original owners may revisit. Tracked for the re-entry/return dimension.

Clorox; Kimberly-Clark; P&G; Kellogg's; General Motors; Ford; Pepsi bottlers (Empresas Polar-bottled; Consumer goods / autos / beverages; Various) — Voluntary exits 2014–2018 under price controls, FX, and operating losses; plants idled or transferred. Re-entry candidates (Portafolio). Pfizer; Sanofi; Bayer; Novartis (pharma majors; Pharmaceuticals; Various) — Scaled down / exited under FX and price-control pressure; re-entry tied to the pharma-return track (Section 04 C.36; Portafolio). Éxito (retail; Supermarket retail; Multiple) — Colombian retailer exit; assets/stores re-entry candidate

(Portafolio). MONACA (Molinos Nacionales; Flour/pasta milling (national); Multiple plants) — Expropriated 2010 (ex-Gruma/Mexican-linked); staple-food milling. Restitution/privatization candidate (Poderopedia/IPYS). CADA (supermarket chain; Supermarket retail; National) — Expropriated (ex-Casino/French-linked Cativen); state-run as Abastos Bicentenario then degraded. Re-tender/privatization candidate (Poderopedia/IPYS). Central Madeirese (supermarket chain; Supermarket retail; National) — Long-standing private grocery chain affected by controls/occupation pressure; recovery/operating-continuity candidate (Transparencia Venezuela). Friosa (cold storage / frozen foods; Cold-chain & frozen-food processing; Multiple) — State-intervened cold-chain operator; cold-storage backbone for food logistics. Operating-concession candidate (Transparencia Venezuela). RCTV (Radio Caracas Televisión; National TV broadcaster; Caracas) — License non-renewal May 2007 (de facto closure); transmission equipment compelled into state use (TVes). Press-freedom restoration + restitution/spectrum-return context (Poderopedia/IPYS). El Nacional (newspaper; Historic national daily; Caracas) — Judgment-driven asset seizure (2018 Diosdado Cabello defamation award; HQ building embargoed); forced to digital-only. Restitution/press-freedom restoration context (IPYS Venezuela). Closed PRIVATE radio & regional press (RCR, CNB, Radio Caracas Radio, Mérida/Zulia/Táchira outlets; AM/FM stations + regional newspapers (private); Nationwide / regional) — Wave of CONATEL license non-renewals and forced closures of PRIVATE outlets (200+ radio stations since 2009; regional papers shuttered by newsprint denial via the state CADIVI/Complejo Editorial Alfredo Maneiro monopoly). Spectrum/license RESTITUTION and a free-media reopening framework needed (distinct from the STATE outlets in A.4.3, which are restructuring candidates; IPYS Venezuela · Espacio Público).

Sector buckets and entries continue to expand as sourcing is verified. Categories follow the restitution framework's four postures (unpaid expropriations; settled/negotiated; stay-and-adapt; voluntary exits) plus the distinct corruption-acquisition category (A.6). Cross-references: privatization architecture in Section 04 (C.5, C.8–C.14); restitution/compensation architecture in Section 04 items C.7 and C.7.1; the individual-accountability dimension sits in the separate confidential Accountability Registry. Named figures under investigation appear here only with credible-source attribution and are not assertions of guilt.

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Feedback

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