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Comparative Data Reference

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Pre-Chavez benchmark · Full-year 2025 estimates · June 2026 current state (n/c: May prints carried forward pending June month-end publications)

The 1998 and 2025 columns are structural benchmarks across all editions; the right-most column refreshes each issue. The column is labeled June 2026, but June month-end publications had not posted at build time, so it carries the May prints (the latest verified figures) under an n/c tag, to be refreshed with June data next lock cycle.

05.1 — Macro Economy

Indicator	1998 (Pre-Chavez)	2025	June 2026
GDP (nominal, USD)	\$101.2B (State Dept)	\$95–105B (IMF est.)	95–105B▼▼GDPpercapitaUSD4,200–4,5003,200–3,500est.Slowimprovement■RealGDPgrowth+0.2
Int'l reserves (BCV)	\$14–16B	\$9.0–9.5B	\$13.21B (BCV+FEM, Jul 16 pub.)▲
External debt	\$29–32B (IG)	\$150–170B (default 2017)	\$150–170B (restructuring TBD)▼▼
Debt-to-GDP	28–32%	150–180%	180–200%▼▼
Poverty rate	49–52%	75–80%	75–80%▼▼
Extreme poverty	22–27%	50–55%	50–55%▼▼
Unemployment	11–13%	45–55% (informal dominant)	Similar▼

Note. 1998 nominal GDP \$101.2B (State Dept; range \$97–101B). All-time nominal peak approximately \$372B (2012). Q1 2026 indicative; reliable national stats not regularly published.

05.2 — Wages & Labor

Indicator	1998	2025	June 2026
Min. wage (USD equiv.)	175–220/mo	3–5/mo	3–5/mo▼▼
Min. wage + food ticket	195–240/mo	30–40/mo	30–40/mo▼▼
Integrated worker income (May 1 floor)	(same as min. wage + food ticket above; “ingreso mínimo integral” as a separate concept introduced post-2018)	\$190/mo	\$240/mo (May 1 raise)▲
Pension floor (IVSS)	175–220/mo (1995 Ley de Homologación pegged pension to minimum wage)	\$58/mo	\$70/mo (May 1 raise)▲
IVSS pensioners (incl. Amor Mayor)	≈387,000	≈5–7M est.	n/c — IVSS not publishing▼▼
Avg salary (economy)	340–480/mo	60–130/mo	70–160/mo■
Oil sector (intl co.)	1,400–2,800/mo	1,200–3,500/mo	1,500–4,000/mo (rising)▲

Indicator	1998	2025	June 2026
Formal employment share	48–52%	28–32%	Similar; informal dominant ▼

Note on Pension floor (IVSS) 1998: the Ley de Homologación de las Pensiones del Seguro Social y de las Jubilaciones y Pensiones de la Administración Pública al Salario Mínimo Nacional (Gaceta Oficial 4.920 Extraordinario, June 16, 1995) established the “Pensión Mínima Vital” — pegging the IVSS pension floor to the national minimum wage. The 1998 figure shown therefore matches the contemporaneous minimum wage. The constitutional anchor (Art. 80, 1999 Constitution) subsequently codified that “las pensiones y jubilaciones otorgadas mediante el sistema de Seguridad Social no podrán ser inferiores al salario mínimo urbano.” Sources: Gaceta Oficial 4.920 Extraordinario; Convite AC pension series (Issuu, Cuadro 4).

Note on Integrated worker income 1998: the “ingreso mínimo integral” as a distinct line item — combining salario mínimo plus cestaticket plus the post-2018 “bono de guerra económica” — emerged as a fiscal construct only after 2018; in 1998 the minimum wage and food ticket together (row above) were the operative floor. The two rows therefore reference the same 1998 base.

05.3 — Oil & Gas

Indicator	1998	2025	June 2026
Crude production	3.4 mb/d (peak)	≈900 kb/d (2024 avg)	Mar 1,095 kb/d (OPEC); Apr ≈1.15–1.20 prelim ▲
Oil exports	2.9 mb/d	800–950 kb/d	1.23 mb/d (Kpler April; 7-yr high) ▲
Primary buyer	USA (3.0 mb/d)	China (75–80%)	China ≈584 kb/d (May #1); U.S. ≈140 kb/d; China excluded from 2026 GLs ▲
Brent (close)	\$12/bbl	\$80/bbl avg	\$104–108 May 11–12; \$107–114 Apr 30 ▲
Royalty rate	16–33%	12–25% (2026 law)	12–25% (case-by-case) ▲
Corp. income tax (oil)	67.7%	50%	Reduced; framework under review ▲
Eff. government take	65–75%	55–65%	50–60% ▲
Diluent source	US Gulf Coast	Iran → US → Russia (rotating)	US under GL 47 (Feb 3, 2026) ▲
Active rigs	130–150	28–35	30–38 ▲
Proven reserves (rank)	74B bbl — #8	303B bbl — #1	303B; 17.5% world total ■
Gas reserves	9th (180 tcf)	7th (221 tcf)	7th; ≈5,500 BCM; Dragon 4.2 tcf licensed Oct 2025 ▲
Gas production (net)	1.1 bcf/d	≈0.8–1.0 bcf/d	≈0.8–1.0 bcf/d; ≈80% associated ■
Gas flaring	2–4 bcf/d	8–12 bcf/d (world highest)	8–12 bcf/d ▼▼

Sources: PDVSA reserves docs; OPEC MOMR; Kpler. Crude-grade and reserve-composition detail (Merrey, Boscán/Orinoco extra-heavy) is carried in Section 06.1.

05.4 — Electricity

Indicator	1998	2025	June 2026
Installed (nameplate)	18–22 GW	≈34 GW (hydro 19 + thermal 15)	≈34 GW; ≈13 GW effective ▼▼
Hydro	14 GW	≈19 GW nameplate; ≈9 GW available	≈9 GW available ▼
Thermal	4–6 GW	≈15 GW; <20% utilization	≈4 GW available ▼▼
Caroní hydro	12.7 GW (Guri + Macagua)	16 GW (6 plants)	Same; Tocoma (2.16 GW) stalled 70% ■
Generation	85–90 TWh/yr	40–48 TWh/yr est.	≈40 TWh ▼▼
Peak consumption	≈18–20 GW	≈12–15 GW	≈13 GW; zero margin ■
Daily outages	Rare	4–12 hrs	8–10+ hrs post-May 7 ▼

05.5 — Mining & Commodities

Indicator	1998	2025	June 2026
Iron ore exports	14–16M t/yr; world top-10	20M+ t/yr; fastest-growing VZ export	Sidor restart candidate ▲
Steel (Sidor)	4.2–4.5M t/yr; world #1 DRI	<700k t/yr	GL 49A/54 restart candidate ▼
Aluminum	650–700k t/yr; 15th globally	<50k t/yr; smelters idle	Cost advantage intact; GL 54/55 ▼▼
Gold (formal)	9–11 t/yr	20–30 t/yr (much informal)	GL 51A/54/55 open formal trade ■
Coal (Guasare)	7–8M t/yr peak; ≈880M st reserves	≈0.3M t/yr (2024; Dec restart); 805M st proven	Q1 2025: ≈3M t; track 8M+; not sanctioned; Turkey buyer ▲
Cement	8–10M t/yr peak (5 majors)	<2M t/yr; state-controlled	Privatization candidate ▼
Cocoa exports	15–18k t/yr	28k t/yr est.; \$250M; fine aroma	FX diversification play ▲
Coffee	70–90k t/yr	22–28k t/yr est.; \$35–50M	Quality rehab underway ▲

05.6 — Trade & Connectivity

Indicator	1998	2025	June 2026
Total U.S.–VZ trade (goods)	\$18–20B peak	\$6–8B est.	Rebuilding under 2026 GL framework ▼
U.S. imports from VZ	\$12–14B (crude dominant)	\$5–7B est.	Resuming via established U.S. entities ▲
VZ total exports (all markets)	\$17–19B	\$12–15B est.	Disrupted; rerouting; tanker seizures ■

Arrows. ▲ structural improvement vs 1998/2025 baseline · ▼ deterioration · ▼▼ severe deterioration · ■ flat or mixed. Direction is overall country condition, not investor-friendliness of specific policy parameters.

Sources. IMF WEO 2025/2026, World Bank Open Data, OPEC MOMR, U.S. EIA, USTR, Transparency International CPI, Foro Penal, R4V/IOM/UNHCR, IISS Military Balance, U.S. SouthCom, CIA World Factbook, OVF, Conindustria, ICCO, FAO, MSF/PAHO, UNICEF/ENCOVI, PDVSA reports, FRED H.10, Reuters, OFAC. 2025 figures marked (est.) involve estimation given limited official VZ publication.

05.7 — Governance & Society

Indicator	1998	2025	June 2026
Corruption CPI (0=corrupt)	22/100	10–12/100	10/100 ▼▼
Remittances	<\$100M	>\$4B	Growing; critical income ▲
Ease of doing business	100–110/190	188/190	New laws signal reform ▲
Political prisoners	Very few	863–1,900+ (post-election)	500+ remain; ~900 released; ~20 deaths in custody since 2014 ▲
Diaspora abroad	<200,000	7.7–7.9M	7.9M (UNHCR) ▼
Population (resident)	23.4M	28.0–28.5M	28.5M ■
Active military (FANB)	55,000	123,000 + Bolivarian Militia (365,000+)	123,000 FANB; Militia status in transition ▼
Generals (est.)	100–130	2,000+	2,000+; reduction priority ▼▼
Government employees	800K–1M	2.8–3.2M	Reduction target underway ▼
Public hospitals (est.)	≈280 fully operational	≈120–140 partially operational	≈120–140 (MSF/PAHO est.) ▼▼
Public schools (est.)	≈16,000 operational	≈12,000–13,000	Enrollment drop ≈30% vs 1998 ▼▼
University enrollment	≈800,000	≈400–450k est.	Severe brain drain ▼▼

Note on population. Resident population was ≈23.4M in 1998 and is ≈28.0–28.5M today (UN/World Bank/INE). The figures are not strictly comparable because of the diaspora: ≈7.9M Venezuelans now live abroad (UNHCR/R4V), so the combined resident-plus-diaspora total is ≈33.5–36M — i.e., absent the post-2015 exodus, in-country population today would substantially exceed the current resident count. The “Diaspora abroad” and “Population (resident)” rows above should be read together. Sources: UN World Population Prospects 2024; UNHCR/R4V; INE.

Feedback

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