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An Agenda for Democracy

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*Medium **&** Long-Term Initiatives — Phase III (Post-Transition)*

What follows is a list of tasks — among many others — that a newly elected government should take up once democracy has been restored. It is an inspirational list, offered to open the discussion of what should be done, when, how, and how to fund it, rather than a closed program: an agenda meant to be argued with, amended, and improved. The plan is enriched continuously — with each cycle's new events, and with the cooperation of the bulletin's subscribers, whose observations and contributions are incorporated as they arrive. It is the second half of the road map described in the bulletin's masthead: the stage that begins once democracy is restored, following the Transition list (Section 03). Timeframe: 2027–2030. Items are ordered by relevance to economy and investment and grouped by subject without separators; items consolidated from earlier numbering retain cross-references. Forward-looking proposals are written in conditional and analytical language ("could," "may," "would," "might," "is likely to") rather than definitive language ("will," "is," "shall"), unless referring to confirmed actions, enacted measures, or officially announced decisions.

PDVSA & CITGO — Holding/Subsidiary Architecture

PDVSA would exit its upstream JV-equity role and be restructured as the state holding company and sector regulator: private operators own 100% of extraction (no mandatory PDVSA equity), the state retains royalties (collected/enforced by PDVSA in its regulatory capacity), and the Ministry of Energy keeps oil-and-gas policy authority and audits the industry — clean separation of commercial operations (private) from regulatory/fiscal functions (state).

CITGO could be kept as a U.S.-listed public corporation and restructured as the primary international processing and market-securing vehicle for Venezuelan oil. PDVSA (restructured) would hold the CITGO stake on behalf of the state, making CITGO the principal commercial asset on its balance sheet rather than a contested liability, with shares partly distributable in the restructuring (C.7 equity bridge). CITGO retains its three refineries (Lake Charles 165k, Corpus Christi 167k, Lemont 167k; ≈499k b/d). A Venezuelan refining, petrochemicals, and gas-processing holding company — owned by CITGO — could consolidate the refining and petrochemical assets (El Palito, Puerto La Cruz, Cardón, Amuay, the Jose upgraders, Pequiven, and Monómeros) together with Venezuela's principal gas-processing complexes — the Criogénico de Oriente at Jose plus the San Joaquín, Santa Bárbara, Jusepín, and Muscar plants in the east, and the Ulé/Bajo Grande and Tía Juana complexes in the west — under the U.S.-listed parent, placing Venezuela's domestic downstream inside a transparent, U.S.-capital-markets-disciplined structure that preserves regulator/operator separation and ring-fences cash flows from political reversal. Beyond consolidation, CITGO (or the holding) could bring in global operators under operation-and-management agreements on a revenue-sharing basis to run any of the Venezuelan refineries or processing plants — pairing each asset with a top-tier international operator to restore and sustain full operation while ownership stays with the CITGO-held holding. INTEVEP, PDVSA's research-and-technology institute, could likewise be assigned to CITGO and deliberately elevated to an international tier — repositioned as a top-rank energy R&D house and paired, through formal agreements with leading U.S. and Venezuelan universities, to deliver petroleum-science, reservoir, and refining research and technical services worldwide rather than serving the domestic industry alone. Making CITGO the visible owner of Venezuela's refining holding is strategically valuable beyond operations: it gives the country a powerful, internationally recognized asset that puts Venezuela on the same field as the major international oil players, a demonstrable balance-sheet strength that can anchor sovereign credit operations, including the underwriting and credit-enhancement of restructured bonds and the C.7 equity bridge. On the retail side, the 4,300+ U.S. gas-station network could be divested as a discrete value-realization step — selling the retailing footprint to concentrate the group on the manufacturing side of the oil business (B2B refining, marketing, and trading) and to fund upstream/midstream

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acquisitions. On a standalone basis — before any further acquisitions — the overhauled CITGO (its three U.S. refineries plus the consolidated Venezuelan refining, petrochemical, and gas-processing holding) could carry an estimated market capitalization on the order of ≈$30–40B. With that divestment funding and balance-sheet strength, two upside options extend the thesis. First, a strong, well-capitalized CITGO could approach Trinidad and Tobago authorities about a revenue-sharing arrangement to operate Trinidadian gas-processing/LNG capacity — leverage that grows as Trinidad's own gas reserves decline and its Atlantic LNG trains run short of feedgas (the same scarcity driving the cross-border Dragon and Manakin–Cocuina deals, Section 06.1a). Second, a balance-sheet-strong CITGO could be positioned over time to reacquire one or more of the U.S. refineries it divested in past decades (e.g., the former Lyondell-CITGO Houston refinery and the Paulsboro and Savannah plants), rebuilding U.S. refining scale. Captive heavy-crude demand solves the >1.5 mb/d absorption constraint and reads as a recovery upgrade for PDVSA restructured bond holders. Status: board transition underway; CITGO value $13–15B (Delaware basis); $19B+ claims registered; Amber Energy's $5.9B bid pending OFAC license.

Machado at CERAWeek (Houston, March 24) laid out the opposition's most explicit privatization framework: the state "will get out of the way" and the oil/gas sector goes "fully private," PDVSA shrinks dramatically toward full operational privatization, state role "strictly as a regulator." Targets: production from ≈1 mb/d to 5+ mb/d; $150B+ capex over 10 years against 300B bbl reserves (a $1.7T opportunity); 25-year renewable contracts; royalties capped at 20%; fiscal terms locked at signing (no retroactive change); wellhead ownership and reserve-booking; arbitration-backed property rights; nine-month minimum to set election conditions. The framework anchors C.7, C.8, C.9, and C.18. Sources: CNBC · S&P Global Platts · Houston Public Media.

Orinoco JV Round, Maracaibo Brownfields, Offshore Gas Licensing

A new investment round could open Orinoco Belt JV solicitation, Maracaibo Basin brownfield rehabilitation packages, and offshore gas licensing (Dragon, Manakin, Perla expansion). GL 49A (contingent contracts) and GL 50A (named operators) provide the U.S.-person authorization framework, and GL 56 (April 14, 2026) extends contingent-contract authority across all sectors. The round could be structured on the Machado CERAWeek (March 24, 2026) framework where applicable: 25-year renewable contracts, royalties capped at 20%, fiscal terms (including corporate income tax) locked at signing, producer ownership at the wellhead, reserve-booking rights, and property protections backed by international arbitration — under a regulator-only state role. Additional OFAC GL issuances covering infrastructure, telecom, or finance would signal deepening U.S.–Venezuela cooperation; rollback risk exists if the Rodríguez & Rodríguez government fails to meet deliverables.

VZ–Guyana Joint Heavy-Light Export Framework (ExxonMobil) & Continuing

ExxonMobil's Stabroek block produces ultra-light crude (API 28–32°); Venezuela's streams are Orinoco extra-heavy (API 8–10°) and upgraded Merey (≈16°). A joint framework could co-blend Venezuelan extra-heavy with Stabroek ultra-light into a higher-quality medium-API export grade. Three strategic layers: cost efficiency (blending could reduce reliance on imported diluents — currently U.S. naphtha under GL 47 — freeing supply for upgrader feedstock); export optimization (a co-blended medium grade commands narrower Brent discounts than Merey or untreated extra-heavy, improving netbacks and broadening buyers); and infrastructure integration (shared offshore loading and tanker scheduling tied to Guyana's FPSO build-out — Liza, Payara, Yellowtail, ONE GUYANA — creating a regional logistics hub). Critically, any such commercial framework would proceed independently of, and not prejudice, the 1966 Geneva Agreement and ICJ Essequibo process — extraction/blending/logistics is a separate workstream from sovereignty and demarcation. Sequenced after the ICJ 2026 ruling and the Section 04 oil/gas reform milestones.

Continuing the Essequibo claim: Venezuela should advance its claim through every legitimate channel, maintaining that the controversy stems from alleged defects in the 1899 arbitral award (the Mallet-Prevost memorandum alleging pressure

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on tribunal president Martens). The ICJ proceedings focus on the award's validity, but the Court has linked that to the definitive boundary settlement, so validity and merits are unlikely to be fully separable. Strategy: (a) sustain procedural participation (reaffirmed by the May 4–11 hearings) without conceding ICJ jurisdiction or prejudicing the Geneva track; (b) develop the documentary record (1899 award, Mallet-Prevost, Martens irregularities) with support from the Academia de Ciencias Políticas y Sociales (C.44) and the National School of Public Service (C.43); (c) maintain Geneva-track diplomacy in parallel; (d) keep this C.18 commercial cooperation operationally distinct from sovereignty. MFA / MinHydrocarbons / Procuraduría / academic coordination ensures the post-transition government inherits a continuous legal posture.

Downstream Rehabilitation — Jose Upgraders, Refineries & Petrochemicals

The Jose Industrial Complex (Anzoátegui) processes Orinoco extra-heavy crude (API 8–10°) into synthetic light crude; its Petropiar (Chevron JV), Petromonagas, and Petro Roraima upgraders run at 20–30% capacity, and full rehabilitation would take $4–6B over an 18–36 month timeline — the critical enabler for any production scenario above 1.5 mb/d and a structural enabler of the Machado CERAWeek (C.8) 5 mb/d target, which assumes Jose at near-full upgrade capacity.

Refining. The parallel task is the refining system, which a July 2026 Reuters field report found “ugly and rusty” and running at a fraction of capacity after decades of decay (Headlines — Reuters refineries): the 955,000-bpd Paraguaná Refining Center (Amuay + Cardón, Falcón), El Palito (146k, Carabobo) and Puerto La Cruz (187k, Anzoátegui) need a multi-year, multi-billion-dollar overhaul — deep-conversion and FCC rebuilds, reliable grid power, and an end to below-cost domestic fuel pricing — to restore the country's ability to make its own fuels rather than export crude and import products.

Petrochemicals. Pequiven's three complexes are the third downstream leg and a natural export-diversification play: the Morón complex (Carabobo, adjacent to El Palito) for gas-fed fertilizers (ammonia/urea); the Ana María Campos / El Tablazo complex (Zulia) for olefins, plastics and chlor-alkali — which alone needs ≈$1.65B to expand polyethylene and chlor-soda, plus ≈$162M just to restore operational reliability (Asoquim); and the José complex (Anzoátegui), co-located with the upgraders and fed by the eastern Anaco gas hub, for methanol, fertilizers and olefins. Asoquim puts the sector's full recovery at ≈$10B over a decade. Miranda Institute view on an eastern gas-based petrochemical: the east already has the right site — the José complex sits beside Anaco's gas and the Jose port — so the priority is not a greenfield elsewhere but completing and expanding José, reviving the ethylene-cracker project shelved when ExxonMobil exited in 2007, and anchoring new gas-based methanol/olefins output to the ≈221 tcf reserves near Anaco; that converts flared and stranded eastern gas into higher-value exports and pairs naturally with the Cardón IV and Dragon gas developments. Financing should run through the same specific-license, FGDF-routed framework as upstream and sequence upgraders → refineries → petrochemicals against the grid rebuild and the debt-restructuring timeline. Cross-references: Headlines — Reuters refineries; Sectoral Profile (06.1 oil & gas).

Fracking Assessment — Eastern Maracaibo Lake & Maritime Platform

Preliminary geological assessments suggest significant tight oil and shale gas potential. A formal assessment would be prerequisite before licensing decisions. Environmental risk management framework required.

Sovereign & PDVSA Debt

Abstract: Venezuela's ≈$150–180B external default — the second-largest and longest-unresolved in modern history — would be worked out through a unified architecture built on four pillars: an Iraq-style ring-fence protecting reserves and republic assets from creditor attachment during the transition; a legitimacy-tier classification anchoring differential haircuts (pre-2015 debt treated as standard sovereign obligation; post-2017/2018 debt as contracted under institutional capture); haircut benchmarks running from Argentina/Greece/Ecuador to the most relevant comparable, Iraq 2004; and a creative Brady-style resolution — long-dated bonds with oil-linked coupons and GDP warrants, plus equity conversion via a CITGO

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IPO — echoing Venezuela's own December 1990 Brady closing. The post-earthquake sequencing view holds that binding terms should be deferred until a damage-and-reconstruction assessment is folded into the debt-sustainability analysis. This entry now carries the full architecture, the live advisory state, the benchmarks, and the market context in one place — the External Debt section has been consolidated here, into the Agenda where the design belongs.

The stack, and the live restructuring track it must ratify. Venezuela's ≈$150–180B external debt is the second-largest sovereign default in modern history (after Argentina 2001) and the longest unresolved (eight years), with debt-to-GDP near 200% — a profile closer to post-conflict reconstruction (Iraq 2004–06) than a standard LatAm workout. Stack: ≈$32B sovereign bonds, ≈$32B PDVSA bonds + ≈$17B PDVSA arrears, ≈$10B China, ≈$4B Russia/Rosneft, ≈$16B+ ConocoPhillips/Exxon/ICSID and other expropriation awards.

Advisory mandate — Centerview Partners (financial) and Hogan Lovells (legal). The signal event of the cycle is the May 13 launch of a "comprehensive, orderly" restructuring of the sovereign and PDVSA stack and the appointment of Centerview Partners as financial advisor, confirmed via EFE on May 28. Centerview — led on this mandate by French banker Matthieu Pigasse (ex-Lazard; an adviser on the 2012 Greek restructuring) — was selected over Rothschild & Co (the Maduro-era mandate-holder since 2024) and, per Reuters, without a formal competitive bid, with Mauricio Claver-Carone's non-official intermediation reported as a factor (prior Headlines). Per a draft engagement letter seen by Bloomberg (June 11, 2026), Centerview's fee would run to roughly $150M — 0.1% of the total restructured debt, uncapped and contingent on a successful deal — which on the $150–200B stack reaches $150–200M and would exceed payouts on past sovereign workouts, sharpening the no-tender transparency criticism. On June 2 the government's retention of Hogan Lovells US LLP as legal counsel was disclosed via a U.S. DOJ FARA filing (prior Headlines) — a firm with a deep sovereign-restructuring record (Ecuador, Ghana, Argentina) that handles the legal mechanics (creditor protocols, governing-law/CAC questions, litigation and CITGO/ICSID exposure) alongside Centerview's financial structuring. The government committed to presenting a macroeconomic framework and debt-sustainability analysis to the international financial community in June 2026 and to a "unified process" spanning Republic and PDVSA obligations with open, continuous creditor contact (channels venezuela2026@vpse.gob.ve, Venezuela2026@centerview.com). This is the technical anchor of the entire restructuring track; full treatment in prior Headlines. Sources: Bloomberg · El Nacional · Infobae.

Pillar 1 — asset protection during the transition, and the ratification gate. Asset protection during the transition (the Iraq precedent): because negotiations may begin while only acting authorities are in place, the architecture could borrow from the post-2003 Iraq model — under which UN Security Council Resolution 1483 and U.S. Executive Order 13303 granted Iraqi oil revenue and sovereign accounts temporary immunity from creditor attachment and litigation during reconstruction. A parallel ring-fence would shield BCV international reserves, republic assets (including CITGO and other foreign holdings), and current government and oil income from seizure, attachment, or enforcement of judgments while the country completes its transition to full democracy — preventing a disorderly creditor grab during the vulnerable interim and preserving the asset base for an orderly, ratified workout. This protection would be paired with a hard ratification condition: any agreement reached with the acting authorities would be expressly contingent on confirmation by the newly elected National Assembly; failing ratification, the deal would reopen for renegotiation with the elected authorities, and a revised, renegotiated instrument would be submitted to the Assembly for approval. The acting government would thus negotiate and pre-position, but not bind the Republic — keeping signing authority with the legitimately elected legislature.

Pillar 2 — legitimacy-tier classification. Legitimacy-tier classification would anchor differential haircuts: pre-2015 debt (BCV + AN approval) is standard sovereign obligation; post-2017 (Constituent-Assembly capture) and post-2018 (contested election) debt was contracted under institutional capture. China/Russia oil-for-loan lines are a distinct track (continued servicing after the 2017 bond default).

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Pillar 3 — haircut benchmarks, timeline, and the social floor. Haircut benchmarks: Argentina 2005 ≈65% NPV; Greece 2012 ≈75%; Ukraine 2015 ≈20% nominal + recovery instruments; Ecuador 2020 ≈45%; Zambia 2024 ≈40%. The most relevant comparable is Iraq 2004 (≈80–90% nominal on prior-regime debt), supporting a 70–90% range when anchored in multilateral support + an IMF program. Timeline: 18 months aggressive, 24 months base, given the multi-counterparty stack (ICSID, China/Russia bilateral, Delaware CITGO claims). Social floor: 75–80% poverty means any deal must preserve minimum social-expenditure floors.

Pillar 4 — the Brady template and a creative, oil-linked resolution. Venezuela's own Brady precedent is the most directly relevant template. The country closed its last comprehensive commercial-bank restructuring in December 1990 under the Brady Plan — the economic team of BCV President Pedro Tinoco, planning chief Miguel Rodríguez, and debt negotiator Carlos Hernández Delpino restructuring ≈$19–20B of eligible commercial-bank debt that had been in distressed rescheduling since the 1983 "Viernes Negro" default, roughly seven years of arrears and serial reschedulings before resolution, after about a year-and-a-half of Brady-menu negotiation over 1989–1990. The deal offered creditors a menu: par bonds (full face value, below-market fixed coupon), discount bonds (≈30% principal haircut, floating at roughly LIBOR + 7/8), plus new-money, debt-conversion, and temporary interest-reduction bonds; the par and discount bonds were 30-year bullets maturing 2020, their principal collateralized by U.S. Treasury 30-year zero-coupon bonds held in escrow, with a rolling interest guarantee. By available accounts Venezuela negotiated the package largely in-house through its own economic team — apparently without retaining an external financial-advisory firm — a sharp contrast with the current workout's Centerview/Hogan Lovells mandates (the advisory mandate above), and a reminder that sovereign negotiating capacity, not advisory firepower alone, drove the 1990 outcome. The precedent matters three ways: it set the legal-and-market machinery (collateralized long bonds, menu options, IMF/World Bank credit enhancement) any modern deal would update; it created the 2020 maturity wall whose successor PDVSA-2020 collateral now sits at the center of the CITGO litigation (C.8); and it showed that even resource-rich Venezuela ultimately required principal reduction plus multilateral support — arguing for anchoring the new instrument in an IMF program rather than a stand-alone bank deal. (Precise spreads, fees, and tranche sizes are historical approximations pending a primary-source audit.) Sources: World Bank · EMTA · Cato Journal.

Creative resolution: Brady-style with modern instruments — differential haircuts by legitimacy tier; long-dated bonds with oil-linked coupons and GDP warrants; equity conversion via CITGO IPO and oil/gas/electricity listings on a rehabilitated Bolsa de Valores de Caracas. A parallel forensic audit of foreign-financed unfinished public works (Chinese rail/metro/housing, Russian arms plants, Petrocaribe infrastructure) would reconstruct contracted-vs-delivered capacity and feed both the creditor classification and the C.50 binational review.

The IMF's participation would be a load-bearing element of that architecture rather than an optional endorsement. In every comparable workout, the Fund supplied the three things a restructuring cannot manufacture for itself: an independent debt-sustainability analysis establishing how much debt the economy can actually carry — the number from which every haircut is derived and the only figure creditors and debtor can both cite as neutral; an Article IV surveillance and data-normalization framework that restores the audited macro statistics creditors need to price the new instruments; and a program anchor whose conditionality and financing assurances give the fiscal and monetary path enough credibility for creditors to accept term extension instead of litigation. Venezuela's case makes each of these more acute: the statistical blackout means there is presently no agreed baseline for GDP, reserves, or arrears; the earthquake damage must be folded into the sustainability envelope before any binding terms are struck; and the Fund's own re-engagement is already the gate on the SDR balance and any rapid-financing line (the Transition (BCV Board)), so the same compliance steps — resuming national statistics, clearing overdue membership charges — unlock both the liquidity and the restructuring's analytical foundation. The sequencing implication is that IMF normalization should run ahead of, not parallel to, binding creditor negotiations: a debt agreement struck without a Fund-validated DSA would be renegotiated later, and a legitimacy-gated National Assembly ratification (the legitimacy gate below; Section 04 C.7) is far easier to defend when the sustainability numbers carry an independent multilateral imprimatur. Miranda Institute view: the Fund's technical role, not its money, is the decisive contribution here — the DSA and the data framework are what make the haircut defensible.

Post-earthquake sequencing (Miranda Institute view). The June 24 disaster is a material new variable that argues for pausing the live restructuring negotiations (the advisory mandate above) rather than pressing them to term. Until the ultimate human and economic toll is known — the UNDP/UN damage range already runs to several percent of GDP, with reconstruction needs on top (the Transition (Earthquake Recovery)) — the debt-sustainability analysis, the achievable haircut, and the fiscal space for a social-expenditure floor cannot be responsibly fixed; locking in terms now risks either a deal that proves unsustainable once reconstruction costs land or one struck from a needlessly weak position. The prudent course is to advance only the non-binding pre-positioning (data room, creditor classification, instrument design) while formally deferring any binding term-sheet or standstill commitment until a post-earthquake damage-and-reconstruction assessment is folded into the DSA — a pause that also aligns with the legitimacy gate in the section intro, since binding authority rests with the elected Assembly in any case. External analysts have made the same point from the market side: Venezuelan sovereign and PDVSA notes have sold off more than 10% since the mid-May restructuring launch, a slide that accelerated after the quake as investors priced a bleaker outlook (the Transition (Earthquake Recovery)) — reinforcing the case for sequencing the workout around a post-disaster damage assessment rather than rushing terms.

The arrears layers beneath the bond stack — commercial and multilateral. Commercial-arrears layer — the Duro Felguera case. Beneath the bond stack sits a largely unquantified layer of corporate commercial arrears, and the Spanish engineering firm Duro Felguera is its emblem: Venezuela owes the Asturian company ≈€120–130M for the Termocentro combined-cycle plant (Miranda state) — awarded in 2009 for >€1.5B by Electricidad de Caracas, operational since October 2012, unpaid since February 2017 — a receivable the firm now books as uncollectable (≈€74.8M provisioned plus ≈€72.5M in uncounted contingent interest). The debt's history runs through Spanish politics: Zapatero's failed intermediation, the Ábalos/Aldama oil-swap schemes and the January 2020 "Delcygate" airport episode, and a SEPI state rescue (March 2021, €120M) suspiciously close in size to the unpaid Venezuelan receivable; Spain's Audiencia Nacional has set trial for this October over alleged $105M in bribes to ex-viceministers Nervis Villalobos and Javier Alvarado for the original award. The live development: the company has opened diplomatic negotiations with the Rodríguez government to collect. The case matters beyond one firm — European corporate creditors of this class will queue at any restructuring perimeter, and how the interim government treats verified commercial arrears (against a receivable whose own procurement is under bribery trial) is an early template for the claims triage below. Sources: The Objective · OKDiario · Vozpópuli.

Multilateral arrears and re-engagement capacity. Distinct from the bonded and bilateral stack, Venezuela carries arrears to the regional development banks that must be cleared (or restructured) before those institutions can lend again — the binding sequencing constraint on reconstruction finance. Venezuela owes the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) on the order of $2B in arrears (per analyses including the National Interest's IDB-recovery framework); it has no active World Bank or IDB loan portfolio after a decade of isolation. CAF (the Caracas-based Development Bank of Latin America) is the more available near-term channel — co-founded by Venezuela, it lent into the country for decades and operates without IMF-style conditionality, though analysts (the Harvard SYPA debt framework) estimate Venezuela could raise only ≈$1–2B from CAF over a four-year horizon, with materially larger sums ($5–10B from the World Bank, $1–5B from the IDB) available once arrears are cleared and a non-provisional elected government unlocks program lending. The practical order: clear/normalize multilateral arrears (a first credibility test) → IMF Article IV completion → IDB/World Bank program loans post-elections. Clearing the IDB arrears transparently — potentially including recovered corruption/narcotrafficking proceeds — is itself an early signal of transition seriousness. Sources: National Interest · Harvard SYPA (Moatti/Muci) · Devex.

Market context. The live marks sit in Section 01: the EMBI spread carries the July 7 print of 7,098 bps (a post-quake giveback against the ≈50% first-quarter compression, still the widest sovereign spread on the JPM EMBI Global

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Diversified), and the VENZ 2031 benchmark is marked in the 30s¢ on the dollar for a recovery consensus of 50–60¢ contingent on an IMF anchor; Bloomberg reported the defaulted sovereign and PDVSA notes handed investors losses above 10% since the mid-May restructuring launch, a slide that accelerated after June 24 as the market priced the reconstruction bill — reinforcing the sequencing case above.

The design conversation is best anchored in the record of the great restructurings — including Venezuela's own. The reference table assembles the key parameters of the cases most cited in the Venezuela literature — Greece 2012, Iraq 2004–06, Argentina 2005/2020, and Venezuela's previous restructuring, the 1990 Brady deal — against the file's working assumptions; figures are approximate, drawn from the IMF/market restructuring literature, for design orientation rather than precise history.

Parameter	Greece 2012 (PSI)	Iraq 2004–06	Argentina 2005 / 2020	Venezuela 1990 (Brady)	Venezuela (prospective)
Debt treated	≈€200B private bonds	≈$120B claims (Paris Club + ≈$20B commercial)	≈$82B / ≈$65B	≈$19.7B commercial bank debt	≈$150–160B total claims (≈$60B bonded)
Haircut (NPV)	≈65–75% (53.5% face)	≈80% (Paris Club-mirrored)	≈65–75% / ≈45%	≈30% face on discount bonds (NPV ≈30–40%)	market recovery consensus 50–60¢ implies ≈40–50%
Avg maturity after	≈20+ yrs (2023–2042 amortizing)	≈20 yrs (2028 bond)	≈30 yrs / ≈15–20 yrs	30-yr par/discount, principal collateralized	long-dated expected; Brady-style menu discussed
Grace period	≈10 yrs principal	principal deferred to 2020s	multi-year / interest grace to 2024	≈7 yrs (varies by instrument)	expected, tied to reconstruction window
GDP warrants	Yes (GDP-linked securities)	No	Yes (2005; famously costly) / rejected 2020	No	debated; lesson: cap payouts, define triggers tightly
Oil warrants	n/a	No	No	Yes — oil-linked value-recovery rights	natural candidate — the direct domestic precedent
State-contingent instruments	GDP warrants	No	GDP warrants / none	oil value-recovery rights	oil-linked SCDIs the live design question
Cash sweetener	≈15% of face in EFSF notes	small-claims cash buyback	minimal / none	collateralized principal (zero-coupon UST) + new-money options	possible via FGDF accumulation, subject to EO 14373 mechanics
IMF program	Yes (EFF, troika)	Yes (SBA anchor)	No (2005) / EFF followed 2022	Yes (1989 EFF — El Gran Viraje)	expected anchor; legitimacy gate first (the legitimacy gate below; Section 04 C.7)
Scheduled debt service/GDP after	moderated to program path	low single digits	moderate / back-loaded	moderate	target: single digits through the reconstruction decade

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Parameter	Greece 2012 (PSI)	Iraq 2004–06	Argentina 2005 / 2020	Venezuela 1990 (Brady)	Venezuela (prospective)
FX gap at restructuring	none (euro)	minimal (managed peg)	none 2005; ≈70–100% cepo era pre-2020	minimal — RECADI multi-tier dismantled 1989, unified float pre-deal	≈12–14% now, from ≈30% pre-quake — unification (Section 01) strengthens the exchange's credibility

Three lessons the table encodes: contingent instruments work when triggers are objective and payouts capped (Argentina's 2005 GDP warrants overpaid; Venezuela's own 1990 oil value-recovery rights are the direct domestic precedent for oil-linked instruments, with verification infrastructure the FGDF already runs); deep haircuts hold when an IMF program anchors the path — true in 1990 as in 2012 — and wobble without one; and a wide official-market FX gap at exchange time poisons the sustainability arithmetic, an argument for completing unification before, not after, the definitive exchange — as Venezuela itself did in 1989.

[Updated since the previous issue]

Gold Reserve Recovery (UK) — the Bank of England Bars

Relocated back to the Democracy agenda this cycle: with custody stabilized (below), release is best treated as a post-transition matter rather than an immediate transition priority.

The ≈31 tonnes of Venezuelan monetary gold at the Bank of England — valued above $4B at current gold prices (earlier case filings and reads referenced $1.0–1.9B at lower valuations) — remain the single largest recoverable sovereign asset outside the FGDF perimeter. The custody question has now been joined from the legitimacy side: the Supreme Tribunal appointed by the 2015 National Assembly (the legitimate TSJ, sitting in exile) has asked the United Kingdom to keep the bullion in safe custody until legitimate Venezuelan authorities are constituted — a request that cuts directly against the acting government's July 8 letter to King Charles III seeking release for reconstruction (Headlines (Washington Sets Transition Talks for Early August) — July 13 edition — carries the full case history: the 2019 freeze, the 2020–21 High Court and Supreme Court rulings under the "one voice" doctrine, the post-2023 drift, and the inverted recognition question now that the claimant is a U.S.-recognized administration). In the meantime the position is not value lost: the gold remains part of Venezuela's international reserves as registered by the BCV, and the Bank of England vault is arguably the best custody location available — segregated, audited, and beyond the reach of any interim misappropriation — so the asset appreciates with the gold price while the instructing-authority question awaits resolution. Post-transition, release could proceed under a verified-use framework integrated into reserve restoration; a realistic intermediate scenario would be a London–U.S. Treasury understanding releasing the metal under a restricted-use architecture mirroring the FGDF mechanism Treasury already applies to oil-export proceeds under EO 14373, with disbursements routed through monitored accounts against verified reconstruction and reserve-restoration uses — trading unrestricted control for access, and resolving the instructing-authority question for London without a unilateral recognition ruling. Switzerland's custody of ≈127 tonnes (over $5B, with the Maduro circle's assets frozen after the January capture) would sit on the same post-transition track.

Monetary Stabilization, New Pegged Bolívar & Petro Retirement

The multilateral inflow would create the dollar-liquidity tailwind to unify the exchange rate at a single market-clearing level. A new currency pegged to the U.S. dollar and backed by multilateral reserve support could formalize the stabilization. The Petro (2018) would be formally retired or repurposed — any IMF program is likely to require this before close. Inflation control would follow the standard recipe: fixed unified FX plus credible fiscal anchor plus multilateral liquidity breaks the monetary-expansion cycle. Peru 1990–1993 took inflation from 7,600% to single digits within three years; Venezuela's de

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facto dollarization could shorten the expected timeline. Salary adjustment beyond the May 1, 2026 floor and consumer-price correction across fuel and public services would be best sequenced at the same window. Compliance with UN Bachelet Report recommendations is the de facto precondition for concessional credit at scale.

Miranda Institute view — on full dollarization. In our opinion, formal dollarization would halt the inflation process in the short term, but at a structural cost that warrants caution. It would tie the local economy to U.S. Federal Reserve decisions, which are always a response to U.S. domestic conditions rather than Venezuelan ones, leaving Venezuela without a monetary policy calibrated to its own cycle. The BCV would lose monetary management as a disciplining response to fiscal wrongdoing — removing the exchange-rate-and-money lever that, used responsibly, signals and constrains fiscal excess. On the real-economy side, wages would effectively be indexed to U.S. productivity standards; combined with the loss of an independent exchange rate, this would erode the competitive advantage of producing value-added goods domestically, pushing Venezuela toward being an exporter of raw commodities and an importer of finished goods. Our preference is therefore the pegged-but-sovereign bolívar described above (a credible hard peg with multilateral reserve backing and BCV autonomy), which captures most of the short-term inflation-anchoring benefit while preserving a domestic monetary instrument and the policy space to build an industrial base — rather than ceding monetary sovereignty wholesale to the Fed. This is a Miranda Institute editorial position offered for debate, not a settled forecast.

Miranda Institute view — against currency-purchase restrictions. The BCV's June 15, 2026 reimposition of foreign-currency purchase quotas (≈$1,000/month, $12,000/year per person; prior Headlines) is, in our view, a step in precisely the wrong direction. There should be no restrictions on buying, selling, or holding any currency: free convertibility is what builds confidence in a stabilization, whereas quotas revive the failed CADIVI-era controls, signal scarcity, and create fear in the market — the very fear that pushes demand toward the parallel rate and widens the gap the controls were meant to close. A credible peg is sustained by ample reserves and fiscal discipline, not by rationing access to dollars; the transition should commit early and publicly to unrestricted multi-currency trading (bolívar, dollar, euro, and digital equivalents) so households and firms trust the regime rather than racing to exit it. This is a Miranda Institute editorial position offered for debate.

Hydro Major Maintenance — Guri, Macagua, Caruachi

Siemens and GE assessments (2025–2026) quantify the deferred maintenance backlog at the three plants (≈14,900 MW combined nameplate capacity: Guri 10,200 MW + Macagua 2,540 MW + Caruachi 2,160 MW). Guri alone is the third-largest hydroelectric plant in the world. Maintenance is the binding constraint on electricity-sector reliability. Grid rehabilitation expert consensus is approximately $20B for full modernization.

Tocoma Hydroelectric Resumption & Completion (2,160 MW)

Stalled at approximately 70% completion; $3B+ remaining to complete; the single-largest discrete brownfield restart in Venezuelan electricity.

New Hydroelectric Plants — Western Venezuela

Coverage of Zulia and the Andean states currently exposed to Caroní single-point-of-failure risk.

New Thermoelectric Plants

Diversification away from the 70–80% Guri dependence; CCGT could be the priority technology under the concession-first model in C.11.

Alternative Energy & Innovation Incentives

Solar, small hydro, and biomass for off-grid coverage in suburban, rural, border, and remote areas could reduce national-grid load and improve service to underserved populations. The framework would be supported by tax and financing incentives for renewables, storage, distributed generation, and EV-charging infrastructure — incentives shared with the broader innovation agenda for alternative energy and technology. (Consolidates earlier C.31 and C.32 items.)

CVG Reactivation

Venezuela was the world's #1 DRI producer; Sidor now runs at <15% capacity. Full iron/steel/aluminum/bauxite value-chain rehabilitation could be sequenced under restored Caroní hydro and the new investment framework. The CVG holding spans the integrated Guayana industrial complex: Ferrominera Orinoco (iron ore), Siderúrgica del Orinoco/Sidor (steel), the aluminum chain — Venalum and Alcasa (primary smelters), Bauxilum (bauxite/alumina), and Carbonorca (carbon anodes, the critical input to aluminum smelting) — plus Fesilven (ferrosilicon) and CVG Minerven (gold). Carbonorca's anode supply is a binding upstream dependency for any Venalum/Alcasa restart, so its rehabilitation sequences ahead of smelter reactivation; the whole aluminum chain is gated on Caroní power (Section 06.2).

Forestry — Maderas del Orinoco (formerly Proforca) and MAVETUR. The Uverito plantation (≈600,000 ha of Caribbean pine, eucalyptus, and acacia across southern Monagas/Anzoátegui) is one of the world's largest planted forests. Proforca (1975) became Maderas del Orinoco S.A. (2012; ≈$500M state investment), then in February 2019 (Decree 3.767, signed by Tareck El Aissami) was restructured into MAVETUR S.A. — Maderas del Orinoco 51% / Turkish-registered Glenmore Proje Insaat 49%. Per Armando.info / Correo del Caroní / Infobae, Glenmore was in fact controlled by the Alex Saab / Álvaro Pulido network; the contract preceded the Gaceta Oficial decree by nearly a year and the counterparty was a Barranquilla-born Colombian lawyer (Mario Germán García Palacios), not a Turkish national. Since 2019: ≈8,000 ha lost to uncontrolled wildfires (after the fire brigade was dismissed), ≈900 workers fired without severance, and exports shifted to low-value wood chips. Accountability runs through C.42 and the separate confidential Accountability Registry (Saab network); the reactivation question is whether to unwind the JV (likely, given Saab exposure) and re-tender Uverito transparently with restored fire-management and enforceable reforestation milestones. Vertical-integration potential: pulp/paper, sawn timber, prefab components, and biomass feedstock for the Caroní thermal-balancing layer (C.4).

Disposition strategy for the CVG industrial cluster (Ferrominera, Sidor, Venalum, Alcasa, Bauxilum, Carbonorca, Fesilven). Rather than sell these decapitalized, sub-capacity plants outright at a depressed valuation, the transition could enter into profit-sharing agreements (or operating/management contracts and JVs) with international steel, aluminum, and mining corporations that bring capital, technology, and offtake. Under such agreements the international partner rehabilitates and operates the plant and shares the upside, while an outright divestiture is deferred to a later moment — once the assets have been modernized and are running near capacity, so the State (or the restitution pool) captures fair value rather than crystallizing a bottom-of-cycle price. This mirrors the broader Privatization Schedule disposition note (lease/operating-agreement-then-sell) and the concession-first electricity model (C.11); it is especially apt for the CVG chain because the assets are power-dependent (Caroní), capital-intensive, and require committed offtake to be viable. Sequencing: Carbonorca's anode supply and Ferrominera's ore feed are rehabilitated first (they gate the smelters), with profit-sharing structured along the integrated chain.

CAVIM Assessment & Reactivation — Munitions, Drones & DoD-Certified Joint Ventures

CAVIM (Compañía Anónima Venezolana de Industrias Militares), the state defense-industrial company founded in 1975, is entangled with the sanctioned partners a transition must exit: its Maracay metal-mechanical complex produces Russian-licensed AK-103 rifles and, since 2025, houses the first Kalashnikov ammunition plant in the Americas — built by Russia's Rosoboronexport, rated at up to 70 million cartridges a year — while its drone capability (Mohajer-6 and ANSU-100 assembly at El Libertador Air Base) has run on an Iranian technical mission present since 2012. A democratic government could begin with a full technical, financial and security assessment of CAVIM's plants (the Maracay

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munitions/foundry complex and the Morón chemical/explosives complex), then reactivate the viable lines under a clean-partner framework: winding down the Russian and Iranian involvement (both excluded under the U.S. general-license conditions), recertifying supply chains, and re-tooling for legitimate output. Three opportunities stand out. (1) An export line — small-arms ammunition and light munitions for the Andean and wider Latin-American market, where regional buyers rely on distant or costly suppliers, subject to strict end-use and export-licensing controls. (2) A drone factory — a feasibility study for domestic UAV manufacturing (ISR plus civil uses: agriculture, energy-asset inspection, disaster response, border monitoring) built on Western rather than Iranian technology. (3) Joint ventures with U.S. defense corporations certified by the Department of Defense, bringing capital, certified technology, quality systems and market access, with the state retaining a minority or golden-share stake under DoD/State export-control oversight. Miranda Institute view: CAVIM is a latent industrial asset, not only a security liability — reactivated transparently, on the competitive-bidding standard (the Transition — Restoring Transparent Public Bidding) and with DoD-certified partners, it could become an export earner and a hub for defense-adjacent technology transfer, aligning with the arrival of U.S. defense-technology expertise on the reconstruction team (Headlines — U.S. Adds a Defense-Tech General). It should be sequenced with the military-reform and civilian-control agenda (the Democracy agenda — Military Enhancement) and gated on the sanctions framework.

Minerals & REE Research Institute — Assigned to CVG

A Minerals and Rare Earth Element Research Institute could be established under CVG, located in the Bolívar State / Arco Minero / Guayana Highlands corridor. Scope spans the full Venezuelan mineral inventory: iron, steel value-chain inputs, gold, diamonds, coal, copper, bauxite, nickel, cassiterite (tin), coltan (niobium / tantalum), rare earths, and other conventional and strategic minerals — covering both the critical-minerals subset prioritized by U.S. and allied supply-chain frameworks and the broader conventional minerals that anchor CVG's industrial complex (Ferrominera, Sidor, Bauxilum, Alcasa, Fesilven). Modeled on INTEVEP's role in petroleum, the Institute would house metallurgy, mineral processing, environmental remediation, and applied geology programs. A natural founding partnership would be a joint venture with the Escuela de Minas of the Universidad de Oriente (UDO) in Bolívar State, leveraging UDO's regional academic infrastructure and the historical concentration of mining engineering faculty in Ciudad Bolívar / Puerto Ordaz. Additional international partnerships might include USGS, BGR (Germany), CSIRO (Australia), and École des Mines de Paris.

Coal Industry — Carbozulia / Carboturven (Guasare, Zulia)

Venezuela holds approximately 805M short tons of proven coal reserves; total known reserves approximately 10.2B tons. Paso Diablo and Mina Norte restarted in late December 2024 under Carboturven (Carbozulia 51% + Glenmore Turkey 49%). Q1 2025 output approximately 3M tons. High-energy, low-sulfur bituminous; primary market Turkey. Not subject to U.S. OFAC sanctions. ILO 169 indigenous rights and Guasare River protection would be required under any expansion.

Copper, Critical Minerals & REE Expansion

Venezuela's Guayana Shield hosts significant copper, REE, and other critical mineral potential. U.S. strategic interest in non-Chinese critical mineral supply chains creates a favorable geopolitical window for Venezuelan REE development.

Diamond Industry Expansion

Guayana and Bolívar production restoration under the new mining framework.

Social Security Net — Savings Accounts & Debit Cards

Direct cash transfers to the bottom 20–30% of households via digital debit accounts could replace the Carnet de la Patria clientelistic distribution system. Scope and budget would be determined by an independent social-baseline audit. This

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direct-subsidy model also enables the elimination of the Mercal subsidized-supermarket network (and the related state food-distribution apparatus, e.g. PDVAL/CLAP logistics): rather than running a sprawling, opaque state retail chain — long documented as a vector of corruption, import over-invoicing, diversion, and spoilage — the State would put the subsidy directly on the beneficiary’s debit card, which is far easier to implement, target, and audit than a physical supermarket-and-procurement system. Recipients buy from ordinary private retailers at market prices with their subsidized balance, the food-supply chain returns to the private sector, and the audit trail is the (transparent) card-transaction record rather than untraceable bulk-import contracts. The Mercal real estate and logistics assets would be wound down or re-tendered.

National Statistics — BCV, INE, MinEnergy Bulletins, ONAPRE

Restoring credible national statistics is the single most important gating condition for multilateral access and investor due diligence. The framework consolidates several tracks: BCV publication of monetary aggregates, FX, balance of payments, fiscal accounts, and inflation on SDDS-aligned cadence (partially rolled back already per MercoPress reporting on monthly inflation series); INE rebuild as the central statistical authority under independent technical leadership, covering GDP, employment, demographics, and coordinating BCV macro statistics, MinHydrocarbons bulletins, and ONAPRE fiscal accounts; reinstatement of the MinEnergy weekly statistical bulletin (suspended >10 years); and publication of ONAPRE fiscal accounts on a regular cadence. IDB technical cooperation could support methodological modernization and OECD alignment. Restoration of trustworthy national statistics is prerequisite for IMF Article IV re-engagement and credible investor due diligence. (Consolidates earlier C.47 INE-only item.)

Beyond the technical statistical rebuild, the transition could pair the official-statistics restoration with a citizen-facing companion — a quarterly National Social Scorecard, provisionally Compromiso País (“Commitment to the Country”), reporting roughly twenty key social indicators in plain language so that constituents can see, every quarter, the real state of the services they depend on. Where the BCV/INE rebuild serves multilaterals and investors, Compromiso País would serve the public directly: a transparency-and-accountability instrument rather than a macro series. Candidate indicators would span health (hospital bed and ICU availability, medicine and vaccine stock-out rates, maternal and infant mortality), education (school attendance and completion, teacher coverage, learning outcomes), the reach of social subsidies and food programs (transfer and food-box coverage and leakage), and citizen security (homicide and victimization rates) — alongside the service-quality metrics that most define daily life: electricity interrupted hours per user, water-service continuity and shortage frequency, mass-transit capacity expressed as seats per inhabitant, housing adequacy expressed as housing units per inhabitant, the minimum salary measured against the basic food basket (canasta alimentaria), and unemployment and informality. Published quarterly and disaggregated by state and municipality, the scorecard would let citizens track whether conditions are improving where they actually live.

Crucially, Compromiso País could go beyond measurement to ranking — publishing league tables of the best-performing hospitals, public schools and service providers (utilities, transit operators, municipalities). Transparent, comparable rankings would introduce a competition-and-recognition dynamic into public services that have rarely faced one: honoring top performers, surfacing replicable practice, creating achievement motivation among administrators and staff, and giving citizens an evidence base from which to demand better. Over time the benchmarks could be calibrated not only against one another but against international standards, so that a Venezuelan hospital or school measures itself against regional and advanced-economy norms rather than only against the national floor. To give the exercise methodological credibility and shield it from political capture, the initiative would be most powerful if built with an external benchmarking partner: the OECD is the natural lead — its comparative frameworks (PISA for schools, health-system performance indicators, and the “How’s Life?” well-being and “Government at a Glance” series) are the global reference for exactly this kind of cross-unit public-service benchmarking — supported by PAHO/WHO for hospital-quality and health metrics, UNESCO for education measurement, and UNDP and ECLAC for the social-development and SDG-aligned indicators. Inviting the OECD (with

PAHO, UNESCO and UNDP/ECLAC) to co-design the methodology would anchor Compromiso País to international standards from the outset and reinforce the same SDDS/OECD-alignment trajectory the official-statistics rebuild is already pursuing. Compromiso País could also run standardized quarterly quality-of-service polls — representative surveys asking citizens to rate the hospitals, schools, utilities, transit, and public offices they actually use — so that user-reported satisfaction is tracked each quarter alongside the administrative metrics and feeds the same league tables, giving providers a direct, recurring signal of how the public rates them and a citizen-side check against gamed official statistics.

Budget Law & Public-Funds Oversight

The budget rebuild runs in two stages. The interim stage starts now: Venezuela has had no meaningful public budget process in years — spending runs through opaque extra-budgetary funds, with no execution reporting — and the two-chamber agenda that begins August 1 (prior Headlines) creates the opening to (1) formulate a genuine national budget for the rest of 2026 and full-year 2027, on realistic revenue lines (FGDF oil flows, the tax take, the multilateral pipeline of the Transition (Applying for Multilateral Credit Facilities)) and prioritized spending; (2) submit it to the joint Assembly for consideration and approval — the first co-legislated act of the bipartite agenda; (3) publish execution quarterly, by ministry and fund, FGDF disbursements included; and (4) subject the cycle to external audit. A budget considered, approved, and reported through the joint Assembly would do more for institutional credibility than any other single act available to the interim stage.

The permanent stage is the elected government's: a modernized budget law replacing the decree-based framework — medium-term fiscal framework, performance-based budgeting, an independent fiscal council, transparency on extra-budgetary funds and SOE liabilities, aligned with IMF Article IV and OECD standards. Its enforcement half is the Contraloría General (Office of the Comptroller General), re-empowered — merit-appointed Comptroller ratified by the legislature, budgetary autonomy, modern audit capacity — to monitor the right application of public funds across ministries, states, SOEs, extra-budgetary funds, and the reconstruction flows above all, with real-time treasury access, published findings, sanction referrals with teeth, and citizen-complaint channels. Above both stands the Assembly's own oversight, restored to constitutional centrality: standing-committee control over the Comptroller's Office, the Executive's offices, the Judiciary's administration, the Electoral authority, and the Ombudsman — with express authority to engage prestigious independent CPA firms to assist its oversight responsibility (forensic support, certification of execution reports, parallel review of reconstruction flows), contracted transparently and reporting to the committees. The interim process creates the discipline; the reform makes it permanent — the certification the multilaterals and the FGDF-successor mechanics (Item Binational & Multilateral Agreements Review 1999–2026) will require.

Institutional Authorities 2.0 — CNE, TSJ, Independent Judiciary

CNE directors could be renewed through fresh civil-society nominations per Articles 296 and 296-A. TSJ politically appointed justices could be replaced with qualified independent jurists. The Prosecutor General could be independently appointed. The Comptroller General could reactivate audit independence. The Ombudsman could reactivate the human rights function. This is likely the single most important cluster of institutional reforms for attracting capital.

Restoring Democratic Governance in Intermediary Institutions

Beyond the state's own organs, a parallel restoration of democratic governance is needed across the intermediary institutions that shape society's civic mindset — the bodies the Maduro-era TSJ systematically intervened to capture or paralyze. Using Article 293.6 of the Constitution and Article 27.2 of the LOTSJ, the Electoral Chamber and Constitutional Chamber spent two decades annulling elections, imposing ad hoc boards, and suspending leadership votes across civil society. A transition framework could call and guarantee free internal elections — and update each body's electoral rules where they are outdated or were distorted by intervention — across: labor unions and federations (the CTV and sector unions, with the broader pattern of union and gremio intervention documented by Runrunes and the ILO complaints); the autonomous universities, whose rectoral and faculty-association elections (UCV, ULA, others under AVERU) were suspended for years in violation of the Ley de Universidades, with the TSJ imposing electoral conditions universities rejected; the professional colegios and federations (the bar associations — Colegio de Abogados of Caracas, Carabobo, Zulia, Delta Amacuro; the Colegio de Médicos; the Colegio Nacional de Periodistas; the federations of engineers, pharmacists/FEFARVEN, psychologists, bioanalysts, nutritionists, architects, administrators, and social workers); the business and producer guilds (Fedecámaras and its state sections, Fedenaga, the Federación Campesina de Venezuela); and the national academies (the Academia Venezolana de la Lengua, the Academia Nacional de la Historia, the Academias de Ciencias Físicas/Matemáticas/Naturales, Medicina, Ciencias Políticas y Sociales, and Ciencias Económicas), restoring transparent, autonomous membership and officer selection. Restoring genuine, autonomous internal democracy in these bodies — many of which have gone 7–11+ years without valid elections — rebuilds the intermediary civic fabric between the citizen and the state, and is as important to a durable democratic culture as the reform of the formal state institutions above. Sources: Acceso a la Justicia · Runrunes.

Truth Commission (Comisión de la Verdad)

Activation trigger: the Comisión de la Verdad would be constituted when the newly elected National Assembly enters function — formation requires legislative authorization and budget by a fully legitimate Assembly, not the transitional executive, to protect independence and enforceability.

Once activated, an independent, internationally backed Commission grounded in the UN Fact-Finding Mission, OHCHR (Bachelet) reports, IACHR country reports (2017–2026), Foro Penal documentation, and the 2018 OAS Panel of Experts could investigate serious human-rights violations (extrajudicial executions by FAES and other forces, arbitrary detention, torture, sexual violence, political imprisonment, systemic repression) alongside state capture, corruption networks, and illicit enrichment 2013–2026. With archive access, subpoena power, and mixed national–international membership, it would document patterns, determine institutional responsibilities, hold public hearings, build a victim database, refer cases to a special prosecutor, and trace/freeze/recover stolen funds into a Victims' Reparations Fund. A reparations program (compensation, property/employment restitution, medical and psychological rehabilitation, symbolic measures, guarantees of non-repetition) would precede the final report.

Operational input layer: the separate confidential Regional Accountability & Due-Diligence Registry — grouped by source (OFAC/DOJ; ICC/HR; judiciary; Spain/AN; PDVSA/Derwick; oil intermediaries; regional networks; VZ domestic investigations) — provides case-selection, asset-recovery prioritization, and prosecutorial-referral input for the Commission.

Earthquake-response accountability: the June 24 disaster has produced its own body of alleged misconduct that falls squarely within the Commission's remit. Reporting from the affected zones describes abuse of authority, diversion or theft of relief aid and reconstruction resources, and officials obstructing or blocking the community's voluntary rescue and relief efforts (for example, barring civil-society collection centers and delaying foreign rescue teams). The Commission — and the special prosecutor to which it refers cases — would investigate these earthquake-response abuses alongside the 2013–2026 record, documenting with demonstrated evidence and full due-process safeguards the cases in which public authorities abused their power, misappropriated humanitarian resources, or impeded citizen and international assistance, and referring substantiated cases for prosecution and for asset recovery into the Victims' Reparations Fund. A distinct investigative track would examine construction malpractice: the forensic evidence emerging from the collapsed buildings (cf. the building-habitability commission, Transition) of substandard construction and of the bypassing of seismic and preventive building specifications, permitting, and inspection requirements — including within the Gran Misión Vivienda housing stock — so that negligent or fraudulent builders, inspectors, and officials are identified and held accountable where the evidence supports it.

Hydrocarbons Law Reform 2.0 & Ruling Book 2.0

The January 2026 LOH Reform opened critical pathways for private participation, but legal analysis (King & Spalding, Baker McKenzie, Mayer Brown) identifies gaps that Reform 2.0 would need to close. Non-associated gas remains under a separate, unreformed legal framework — a regulatory gap blocking major offshore gas projects (Dragon, Manakin, Mariscal Sucre). Dispute resolution introduces U.S.-law arbitration but enforcement gaps remain for non-U.S. operators, and ICSID re-accession (denounced 2012) is required. The Reform relaxes the 51% PDVSA minimum in certain cases but does not eliminate it categorically; full privatization on the Machado CERAWeek framework (C.8) would require a complete LOH replacement. The new royalty range (12–25%, discretionary) gives the Ministry broad discretion without fixed thresholds, creating uncertainty across administrations — fixed thresholds may be required. Policy durability could require a constitutional-level hydrocarbon framework rather than only an organic law to provide the certainty needed for $150B+ investment. The 180-day transition window for mixed companies formed pre-Reform expires July 2026; legal clarity on that process is critical.

The companion priority is issuance of the LOH ruling book (the implementing regulation — the secondary rulebook specifying licensing procedures, royalty-calculation methodology, dispute mechanics, and standard-form contracts), which remains unpublished in the Gaceta. Without it, transactions proceed case-by-case at ministerial discretion, defeating the predictability the statute was designed to deliver. Issuance is the operational milestone converting LOH from investor-marketing document into working regime. (Consolidates earlier C.10 implementing-regulation item.)

On the fiscal side, the reform could adopt the consolidation proposed by Evanan Romero: merge oil royalties and taxes into a single consolidated government take, differentiated by asset class — 20% for greenfield projects, 25% for super-heavy crude, 30% for inactive brownfields, 35% for active brownfields — so the fiscal burden tracks each barrel's true development cost and reactivation risk, replacing the layered royalty/ISLR/windfall patchwork with one transparent rate per category.

Mining Law Reform 2.0

The new Organic Mining Law — given final unanimous National Assembly approval on April 9 and enacted in Gaceta Oficial Extraordinaria No. 7.020 of April 16, 2026 — is now in force: it opens gold and strategic minerals to private, foreign, state, and consortium participation, caps concessions at 30 years (renewable), sets royalties of up to 13% of gross production, repeals the 1999 mining decree-law and the 2015 Gold Law, bars the president, vice president, ministers, and governors from holding mining titles, and adds criminal penalties and asset-seizure for illegal mining. It is a necessary first step, but expert analysis identifies critical gaps. Environmental impact assessments are required but do not precede contract execution — best practice would require ex-ante evaluation. Prior indigenous consultation lacks specific timelines and benefit-sharing provisions; FPIC is absent. The law does not address the FARC, ELN, Tren de Aragua, or garimpeiros operating across the Arco Minero. There is no Minamata Convention-aligned timeline for mercury and toxic-material phaseout. There is no practical artisanal-miner formalization pathway. Revenue routing would need mandatory public disclosure of concession terms and royalty payments.

Electrical Law Reform 2.0

Venezuela's OLESS reserves all electricity functions for the state via the CORPOELEC monopoly — a legal barrier to private capital. A new organic law would be required. Unbundling separates functions: the Ministry sets policy and as an independent regulator oversees the sector; an independent transmission system operator runs the grid; and private corporations compete in generation and distribution. Privatization would sequence concessions before outright asset sales — long-term concessions for thermoelectric plants, transmission corridors, and distribution regions rather than asset sales in the early reform window. Concession terms would be calibrated to allow private operators to recover capex and earn an adequate return while ultimate ownership stays with the state through the politically sensitive transition. A first-option clause could give existing concessionaires the right of first refusal at fair-market valuation if the government later determines an outright sale is the better policy at a more mature moment — preserving operator continuity, rewarding the operators who absorbed early-cycle execution risk, and avoiding service-delivery discontinuity. Sequence: thermoelectric plants concessioned to private operators (gas-fired CCGT fastest path); transmission concessioned under long-term PPAs; distribution concessioned by region. Cost-recovery tariffs with low-income protections. GL 48A authorizes U.S. goods and services for CORPOELEC.

BCV Law Reform 2.0

The current decree-based framework could be replaced by an AN-approved modern law establishing institutional autonomy for the Central Bank, ending direct BCV financing of the Government and state enterprises, restoring SDDS-aligned publication of monetary, FX, and balance-of-payments statistics, and re-establishing technical governance through a board with fixed terms and independent technical qualifications. The April 16 IMF re-engagement is the external anchor; BCV Law 2.0 would be the domestic counterpart converting that anchor into a working monetary regime. Formal Petro retirement would form part of the same package.

SENIAT Reform — Customs, Tax Automation & Cybersecurity

SENIAT digital infrastructure was recently subjected to a significant cybersecurity breach. Required actions could include: modernization of legal framework with NIST / ISO 27001 alignment; full electronic transactions for customs, permits, and tax filings; automated port and airport customs clearance; cybersecurity hardening of taxpayer databases; and integration with FATF / GAFI and U.S. CBP data-sharing protocols.

Tax Reform 2.0 — the Structural Redesign of the Venezuelan Tax System

Beyond the transition package (the Transition (Tax-Law Reform)), the elected government could undertake the structural redesign the system has needed for a generation — a Tax Reform 2.0 built on simplicity and neutrality: few taxes, broad bases, moderate rates. Its likely pillars: a modernized income tax with inflation-proof brackets and consolidated business taxation; a rationalized VAT with minimal exemptions and fast, credible refunds for exporters; the permanent elimination of distortionary instruments (the IGTF above all); a fiscal-coordination law that harmonizes municipal and state taxation within constitutional bounds; a natural-resource fiscal regime aligned with the hydrocarbons and mining frameworks (Item Mining Law Reform 2.0) so royalties, windfall mechanisms, and income taxation are designed as one system rather than layered improvisations; property-tax modernization as the municipalities' own-revenue base, tied to the cadastral rebuild; end-to-end digital administration as the delivery vehicle (Item SENIAT Reform); and a fiscal-responsibility law that anchors deficits, debt, and the stabilization treatment of oil revenue once the FGDF architecture sunsets. Sequencing would matter: the redesign would follow the transition package's emergency fixes and be legislated with the multilateral technical assistance the re-engagement track brings — so that the elected government's first ordinary budget (Item Budget Law & Public-Funds Oversight carries the interim process) is already built on the new system's projections.

Pension System Reform — IVSS Rescue, Private Funds & LOSSS Overhaul

Section 05 shows the IVSS pensioner pool (incl. non-contributory Amor Mayor) grew from ≈387,000 (1998) to an estimated 5–7M by 2025 — a 13×–18× expansion against ≈1.25× population growth. The post-2011 Amor Mayor scheme extended pensions to citizens with no contributory history as a clientelistic transfer, not an actuarially funded pillar, so the liability now rests on a shrunken contributory base against an order-of-magnitude-larger beneficiary pool.

Reform would begin with a full actuarial audit (contributory vs non-contributory, eligible vs irregular, alive vs deceased) and segregation of Amor Mayor social-assistance from the contributory IVSS pillar. IVSS is actuarially insolvent, sustained only by BCV monetary issuance; private retirement funds (cajas de ahorro, fondos de jubilación) were gutted by hyperinflation,

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FX-control losses, and forced conversions. Reconstruction is a 10–15-year project.

LOSSS reform could establish a hybrid architecture: a public PAYG pillar for minimum floors; privately managed individual capitalization accounts (AFP / 401(k)-style); and a budget-funded, means-tested social-assistance pillar fully segregated from IVSS. Models: Chile 1981 AFP, Mexico 1997 Afore, Peru 1993, Colombia 1993 hybrid. Diaspora contribution eligibility by design via cross-border frameworks. Sequenced after BCV monetary stabilization (C.6) and statistical rebuild (C.2) — without monetary stability no contributory architecture is viable.

Reduction of Government Structure 2.0 & COPRE Reactivation

Public employment grew from ≈800k–1M (1998) to ≈2.8–3.2M (2025) — 3× against a real GDP 15% smaller — so reduction must sequence with private-sector job creation. Parallel state entities (foundations, social corporations, parallel ministries) are fiscal drag and patronage networks; dismantling them creates fiscal space. Priority: Cuadrantes de Paz wind-down (≈30,000–50,000 paid political activists) with severance, retraining, or reabsorption into restructured local policing.

The institutional vehicle could be a reactivated Comisión Presidencial para la Reforma del Estado (COPRE) — created by Decree 403 (Dec 17, 1984, Lusinchi). The original COPRE (1984–1999) drove Venezuela's most successful state-modernization episode: the 1986 reform proposals and the decentralization framework enabling direct election of governors and mayors (1989). Eliminated by the 1999 Constitution. A reactivated COPRE could coordinate ministry rationalization audits, parallel-entity dismantlement, civil-service modernization (with C.43), decentralization restoration, digital-government consolidation, and transparency frameworks — spanning C.46, C.47, C.48, C.49. Membership follows the original model (independent technical experts + party representatives), appointed by Executive decree with National Assembly notification, preserving its advisory/convening character.

A sound public-salary adjustment is integral to this reform, not separable from it. Reducing headcount without fixing pay would leave the remaining workforce on the same poverty wages that make theft, bribery, and corruption a rational survival strategy. Restructuring the national scale of public salaries — a coherent, merit-and-responsibility-based pay scale that restores dignified, livable compensation for civil servants, judges, police, the military, teachers, and health workers — is therefore a precondition for clean government, not a fiscal afterthought. When a customs officer, a judge, or a police officer can support a family on their salary, the economic temptation that rationalizes graft falls sharply; when they cannot, no enforcement regime will hold. The scale would be sequenced with monetary stabilization (C.6) and the broader anti-corruption campaign (C.39): adequate pay plus credible enforcement plus cultural change, together. The fiscal space freed by dismantling parallel entities and trimming patronage rolls is precisely what funds a dignified, defensible salary scale for a leaner, professional public service.

Statutory Realignment — 1998–2026 Law & Decree Review

A unified review of every law, enabling-law package, and decree-law in force since 1998. Track 1 — constitutional realignment: comprehensive realignment to the post-transition framework (or the 1999 Constitution if no referendum), prioritizing instruments passed under contested governance (2017–2026); pre-2015 instruments evaluated against updated standards. Track 2 — repressive-law repeal: the Resorte Law (media), the Ley contra el Odio (Hate Law), and the NGO-control and political-targeting statutes — required for media opening and rule-of-law credibility. Track 3 — presidential decree-law audit (1999–2026): ≈300+ decree-laws across four Chávez Enabling Laws and Maduro authorizations, each classified by constitutional legitimacy, economic effect, and framework alignment. The chronology pairs each Enabling Law with its instruments — 1999 (≈53 decrees); 2001 (49-law package incl. the Lands Law and original LOH); 2007 (≈59); 2010–2012 (≈54 under flood-emergency authority); 2013 (Maduro's first); the 2017 Constituent-Assembly *decretos*; the 2020 Antiblockade Law; and the 2026 LOH Reform. Output: an instrument-by-instrument legitimacy/economic-coherence assessment with a sequenced repeal/reform/retain action plan

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feeding the Section 04 calendar.

Binational & Multilateral Agreements Review 1999–2026

A comprehensive review of every binational/multilateral agreement, treaty, MOU, LOI, and intergovernmental contract signed 1999–2026. Named instruments: the China oil-for-loan framework; Iran condensate swap; Cuba Convenio Integral; Belarus/North Korea/Syria military MOUs; Turkish refined-product and gold channels; ALBA, Petrocaribe, Banco del Sur; UNASUR/CELAC protocols; the 2022 Russia strategic partnership; Colombia border/security/migration agreements; Guyana/Essequibo and Trinidad (Dragon, Manakin–Cocuina) frameworks; OPEC+ commitments; ICSID instruments (denounced 2012); and suspended UN/OAS treaty-body obligations.

This review now has an urgent, live addition: on July 24, 2026 the interim government notified the UN Secretary-General of its "firm and irrevocable" decision to denounce the Rome Statute and withdraw from the International Criminal Court under Article 127 (Headlines, this edition; the Maduro-era Assembly had already voted in December 2025 to repeal the ratification). The agreements review should treat the ICC denunciation as a priority reversible item rather than a settled fact: withdrawal takes one year to take legal effect and does not extinguish obligations that arose while Venezuela was a party, so a transition government committed to international accountability retains a clear window to rescind the denunciation before it matures and to reaffirm Venezuela's Rome Statute membership. Miranda Institute view: the ICC withdrawal cuts directly against the transition's own domestic-justice architecture (the Amnesty Law, the release process, the custody-death record at the Transition (Release of Political Prisoners)) and against the EU and human-rights conditionality attached to the political track — the review should flag it for reversal alongside the other rights-body obligations suspended over the past two decades, and weigh reaffirmation of the ICSID and inter-American human-rights instruments in the same exercise. The denunciation also aligns Venezuela with the U.S. administration's own posture toward the Court, which makes reaffirmation a genuine negotiation variable rather than a purely legal formality.

Each agreement assessed on four dimensions — constitutional legitimacy (Art. 150), economic effect, strategic alignment, operational status — yielding a ratify/renegotiate/denounce matrix. China/Iran/North Korea/Cuba agreements (counterparties excluded from all 2026 GLs) get priority denunciation review; allied agreements (U.S., EU, Canada, Japan, South Korea, regional democracies) get ratification/updating; suspended multilaterals (IMF Article IV, IDB, WB, IACHR) sequence for re-engagement under C.1, ICSID re-accession under C.9.

A stay-or-withdraw register addresses IO affiliations — stay/re-engage: UN system and agencies, OAS, the Inter-American HR System (re-accept IACHR jurisdiction), WTO, IMF/WB/IDB/CAF, Andean Community, UNASUR; withdraw/wind down: ALBA, Petrocaribe, Banco del Sur; restore: Inter-American Defense Board and Río Treaty posture.

OPEC membership deserves its own analysis, and the review could squarely evaluate exit. The case for leaving runs on several converging lines: Venezuela holds the world’s largest proved oil reserves, so its development logic is volume maximization, not cartel volume restraint; production is increasingly operated by third parties and export trading is in the hands of international houses under the 2026 General-License framework, so the state can neither guarantee nor enforce a quota over barrels it does not control; the country’s oil policy is now substantially aligned with the U.S. energy strategy rather than with OPEC’s price-defense posture; the CITGO plan is to grow its share of the U.S. refining industry, a downstream strategy that wants abundant, competitively priced Venezuelan crude rather than restricted supply; the recovery’s enormous revenue requirements — the earthquake-aftermath recovery and reconstruction on top of a two-decade development catch-up — argue for producing every commercially viable barrel; there is simply no national interest in being assigned production quotas at the very moment output is being rebuilt; price sensitivity is structurally lower than OPEC’s marginal members, since production remains commercially attractive at prices well above the ≈$27 per-barrel cost; and the diplomatic ballast is thin — Qatar already showed the exit door is usable (withdrawing in 2019 without lasting damage), and Iran’s accumulated tensions with its Gulf neighbors make the organization’s internal politics a

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liability rather than an asset. Two further considerations close the case's diplomatic column: historically, part of Venezuela's value inside the cartel was as an interlocutor — as a trade partner and close ally of the United States it acted as a lobbyist with its Arab friends whenever Washington needed a channel into the organization; and the channel worked both ways — the Arab member states likewise used Caracas as a friendly conduit when they sought understandings with Washington. That two-way brokerage role is over, since the U.S. now maintains direct and tight relationships with the Arab leaderships, and neither side needs a Caracas intermediary. And the world's main exporting countries increasingly sit outside the voting table anyway — the United States and Russia, the two largest producers alongside Saudi Arabia, hold no OPEC vote (Russia coordinates only through the non-binding OPEC+ framework) — while OPEC's voting members represent roughly a third of world crude production and on the order of 40–50% of internationally traded crude (EIA/OPEC figures, approximate), a share that no longer confers the price-setting power that membership once bought.

The 2026 record has added an empirical column to that diplomatic assessment. The June 24 earthquake made the thinness of the relationship measurable: across the earthquake aid record, assistance from the Arab world amounts to a single press-reported air bridge — from Qatar, itself outside OPEC since 2019 — with earthquake aid from the organization's Arab member states essentially absent at a moment when dozens of countries mobilized. Trade between the Arab states and Venezuela has likewise been modest for decades, so the commercial relationship the cartel might anchor simply is not there — and where a genuine mutual benefit can be identified, bilateral country-to-country agreements could be settled on their own terms, case by case, without the multilateral wrapper. Nor is there a consular or migration ballast: unlike the Americas and Spain, the Middle East hosts no major concentration of Venezuelan refugees or migrants, so the diaspora-services logic that binds Caracas to so many chancelleries carries no weight there. The political record points the same way: unlike the United States and several European and Latin American governments, the Arab states largely avoided recognizing Venezuela's opposition leaderships during the Guaidó and González episodes — a consistent preference for incumbent-state dealing which, whatever its merits, means the OPEC relationship carries no democratic-transition equity to protect. The demand-side geography sharpens the point: OPEC's operative counterparts today are China and India — the two great oil consumers that are not major producers — and Venezuela's influence and trade standing with both is weak and intermediated. Chinese purchases, long the dominant outlet, are receding as every 2026 General License bars Chinese counterparties, while Indian refiners' rising liftings — Bloomberg reported India overtaking China as top buyer in April — run on case-by-case U.S. Treasury approvals rather than on any leverage Caracas brings from the cartel's table; membership buys little standing with the buyers who actually set the market's direction.

The counter-case is narrower but real: founding-member standing (Caracas co-created OPEC in 1960), the market-coordination information channel, and the symbolic cost of exiting during a recovery that still benefits from stable prices. The review could weigh both columns — a question to be debated and decided by the elected government, not pre-decided here.

The review could also incorporate an appreciation criterion drawn from the June 24 earthquake: the aid and support received in the disaster's aftermath — weighed by scale and by speed of arrival — could be considered in prioritizing which binational relationships and agreements are ratified, deepened, or fast-tracked first, as a concrete sign of appreciation to the countries and organizations that gave the most and the fastest (weighed by the aid received in the June 24 disaster).

Bilateral U.S. integration framework: a future democratic administration could negotiate a comprehensive U.S.–Venezuela trade treaty (a bilateral free-trade agreement, or Venezuela's accession to a regional framework) as the anchor instrument — locking in tariff preferences, market access, and rules-of-origin for a recovering export economy — alongside a Social Security Totalization Agreement (IVSS↔SSA credit portability; LatAm precedents exist), a Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT), a Double Taxation Agreement, professional-licensing recognition, E-1/E-2 treaty-trader/investor visa access, and a STEM/education-mobility framework — together easing trade, labor mobility, diaspora return, and capital rebuild. A trade

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treaty would also give institutional permanence to the investment opening now advancing through the energy and minerals deals (cf. Headlines). Sequenced after the Phase III elected government, under Senate + National Assembly ratification, with agency-level implementing rules (SSA/IVSS; USPTO/SAPI; USTR/MFA; Treasury/SENIAT; State INL/MPPRIJP).

Disaster-response technical assistance: the review should add a disaster-risk-reduction and seismic-resilience track — establishing or renewing agreements with recognized international organizations to provide technical assistance for earthquakes and similar natural phenomena. Natural partners include the UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR) and OCHA's INSARAG for search-and-rescue standards and civil-protection capacity-building, the World Bank's Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR) for resilient-reconstruction financing and risk assessment, and bilateral seismic-science and engineering partners (e.g., the USGS and Japan's JICA) for hazard monitoring, early-warning systems, and building-code modernization. Formalizing this assistance — after the acute earthquake response (the Transition (Earthquake Recovery)) — would rebuild the civil-protection and seismic-preparedness capacity that atrophied over the past two decades and embed international best practice ahead of the next event.

The review's end-state on the U.S. file could be the complete lifting of the sanctions architecture — revocation of the Venezuela-related Executive Orders and retirement of the OFAC licensing lattice, Treasury designations, SDN overlay, and sectoral prohibitions (Section 07) — so ordinary commerce no longer runs through licenses at all. Sequencing over declaration: (1) conduct-based delistings on verified facts, not political gestures; (2) the GL lattice converted into ordinary law as each underlying prohibition is revoked, with EO 14373's FGDF architecture sunsetting into transparent budget mechanics (Item Budget Law & Public-Funds Oversight); (3) retirement of the secondary-sanctions exposure that still deters third-country banks and insurers; (4) preservation of the accountability track — targeted designations for documented corruption and abuse survive the general lifting, so normalization does not become impunity. A democratic government could reasonably set full lifting within its first year as the measurable objective of normalization.

[Updated since the previous issue]

Banking Law Reform & State Commercial Bank Privatization

An AN-approved modern law could replace the current framework, strengthening supervisory-authority autonomy and technical capacity, and establishing clear rules on capitalization, risk management, and deposit protection. Functional monetary and financial intermediation would be restored by easing excessive reserve requirements, normalizing interest-rate formation, and enabling foreign-currency operations within a transparent regulatory framework. The three pillars C.3, C.4, and C.5 are interdependent: BCV autonomy without a working capital market would leave stabilization without a transmission mechanism; capital-market reform without banking reform would leave intermediation broken; banking reform without monetary autonomy would leave credit allocation politically captured. The package would need to advance together.

State commercial bank privatization (formerly C.14) is the operational counterpart to the legal-framework reform. State-owned banks: Banco de Venezuela, Banco Bicentenario del Pueblo, Banco Digital de los Trabajadores, Banco de Comercio Exterior (Bancoex), and Banco de la Fuerza Armada Nacional (BANFANB). GL 57 (April 14, 2026) authorized U.S. companies to conduct financial-services transactions with BCV, Banco de Venezuela, and Banco Digital de los Trabajadores — partial sanctions easing that opens limited USD correspondent banking channels for the first time since 2017. Bank Secrecy Act and FinCEN obligations remain in force. Sequenced privatization could begin with the largest commercial bank (Banco de Venezuela) under the same banking-law reform framework and competitive-tender principles as the post-reform private-sector entry.

The reform should anchor compliance with the FATF standards for financial transparency — the 40 AML/CFT Recommendations: risk-based supervision, beneficial-ownership registries, PEP screening, suspicious-transaction reporting, an independent financial-intelligence unit — since exiting the gray-list orbit and restoring correspondent banking

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is a precondition for reconnection to international finance.

Capital Markets Reform

An AN-approved modern law could replace the 2010 Securities Market Law and the 2015 decree-law, restoring regulatory independence, legal certainty, and full capital repatriation. A dual-currency framework would formalize USD issuance and settlement aligned with current market practice. Sequencing would prioritize debt-market development before equity — establishing a sovereign yield curve and reactivating corporate bond issuance — and concentrate early activity in fast-cycle sectors to build liquidity. Market-infrastructure modernization and adoption of international standards would anchor the rebuild; diaspora capital is the natural initial funding source. A targeted listing incentive could deepen the market quickly: the transition government could exhort incoming hedge funds, private-equity, and investment funds to channel a portion of any Venezuelan buyout, acquisition, or start-up through the Bolsa de Valores de Caracas — floating a tranche of equity locally in exchange for tax relief — so domestic investors and the diaspora can share in the recovery while the exchange rebuilds depth. The same tax benefit could extend to public corporations already listed on U.S. stock exchanges (encouraging a dual or secondary Caracas listing) and to private corporations willing to list, broadening the issuer base and anchoring liquidity in the local market.

Labor Law Reform, Salary Adjustments & Public-Payroll Rebalancing

The 2012 Organic Labor Law rigidities could be replaced: an hourly-wage system; severance modernization; collective-bargaining transparency; tripartite governance (state / employer / union) for sector negotiation. The framework would align with the productivity-based wage frameworks required by international investors. Salary adjustment is part of the same reform (consolidated from the former C.65): sequenced with C.6 monetary stabilization, a major adjustment beyond the May 1, 2026 base-salary floor announcement, with integrated worker income recalibrated against productivity and a cost-of-living index. Treating the wage-structure reform and the salary-level adjustment as one item keeps the productivity-indexation logic consistent across both.

The reform's decisive complement is on the employment side, and it runs through private investment rather than the budget. The arriving wave of energy, power, mining, and reconstruction capital (prior Headlines) will create jobs paying multiples of public-sector wages, and policy could be built deliberately around that absorption: promote private investment as the primary job-creation engine, let it draw workers out of an oversized public payroll, and simultaneously freeze positions on the government payroll so that departures are not backfilled — attrition, not dismissal, does the work. The arithmetic is the point. Public employment expanded several-fold after 1999, and returning the payroll toward its 1999 level would free a very large recurring fiscal envelope; applied not to general spending but to the remaining public workers and to pensioners, it is what makes a genuine salary and pension recovery affordable without printing money — the same discipline required by the monetary stabilization at Item Monetary Stabilization, New Pegged Bolívar & Petro Retirement and the fiscal architecture at Item Budget Law & Public-Funds Oversight. The trade the state would be offering is explicit and, properly sequenced, favourable to the worker: fewer public posts, materially better paid, alongside a private sector hiring at higher wages, with retraining and placement support bridging the transition and the hourly-wage framework above making private hiring flexible enough to absorb the flow. The same rationale applies to the armed forces: a professionalized FANB at a rational size — the flag-officer reduction and the Militia's elimination at the Transition (FANB Generals Reduction & Bolivarian Militia Elimination) — releases the payroll room to pay soldiers and officers properly, which is both the fair outcome and the condition for the professionalization the transition needs. Miranda Institute view: the sequencing must protect people rather than merely cut headcount — the freeze and the private-hiring ramp should run together, and the salary and pension increases should be legislated as the payroll falls, so the benefit is visible to those who stay.

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Property Restitution & Expropriation Compensation

Property restitution would run through the same unified architecture as the debt restructuring (C.7), not as a parallel claim universe: restitution bonds redeemable against privatization stakes, carrying the same legitimacy tiers and Brady-style instrument family, administered via a special commission integrated by government officials and a representation from the business community for individual residential/commercial/agricultural claims. Treating restitution and creditor restructuring as one architecture avoids competing claim universes and concentrates negotiation leverage in a single multilateral-anchored process. The scope spans four categories — unpaid or effectively-unpaid expropriations; partially-settled or negotiated cases; “stay-and-adapt” operators who remained; and voluntary exits under deteriorating conditions — each carrying a different claim posture and instrument treatment. The named case-by-case inventory across these categories is maintained in the Privatization Schedule (a Miranda Institute Publication, with size, location, status, original-owner note, and a source link per entry), rather than as a prose list here. Restitution claimants would receive instruments on the same terms as bondholders and ICSID claimants, monetizing the obligation through privatization equity rather than cash outflows.

A second, distinct asset pool sits alongside the expropriation universe: the corruption-derived assets already seized or frozen abroad. Transparencia Venezuela and the Iniciativa para la Recuperación de Activos Venezolanos (INRAV) have compiled the most credible running tally — in their June 2026 update, roughly 719 assets across 21 countries (period 2009–2026) worth on the order of \$3.9B (a “conservative” figure covering only publicly known judicial cases): ≈\$3.57B plus ≈€218.8M, of which 287 assets are already seized and 423 frozen or in confiscation proceedings. The U.S. holds the most (≈335 assets; ≈50 chavismo-linked money-laundering cases), followed by Spain (235), Argentina (58), Switzerland (34), Panama (18), and Colombia (11). By value the pool is overwhelmingly cash: bank deposits and seized funds are ≈95% of the dollar total, with real estate ≈4.2% and luxury vehicles ≈0.24% (in euros: deposits ≈76%, real estate ≈21%). Emblematic line items include the Gorrín network’s 24 properties in Miami (17) and New York (7), and ex-treasurer Alejandro Andrade’s surrendered properties, show horses, and luxury watches (>\$42M); the underlying frauds dwarf the recoveries (the PDVSA-Cripto scheme alone ≈\$17B; “Money Flight” ≈\$1.2B). The transition-relevant point: a large, real, already-immobilized recovery pool exists but is dispersed across jurisdictions with poor visibility into custody. Transparencia Venezuela/INRAV propose an independent international fund — administered under transparent criteria, potentially via the World Bank or IMF — to consolidate, protect, and channel these recovered assets to the humanitarian emergency. Miranda Institute’s read: this recovered-asset fund should be wired into the same restitution-and-reconstruction architecture (C.7) as a dedicated, ring-fenced source, with the accountability detail tracked in the separate confidential Accountability Registry project. Sources: Transparencia Venezuela · El Pitazo · La Gran Aldea. (Renumbered this cycle from the former 04.7a; consolidates earlier C.17 and C.44.)

A distinct restitution category is the looted PDVSA workers’ pension fund. The oil company’s employee retirement fund — roughly \$2.5B in total, with about \$500M+ channeled into the Stamford, Connecticut hedge-fund vehicles of Francisco Illarramendi (a former PDVSA/Finance Ministry adviser), where PDVSA pension money reportedly made up close to 90% of the assets — was destroyed in what U.S. prosecutors called a Madoff-style Ponzi scheme. The SEC filed civil fraud charges in January 2011; Illarramendi pleaded guilty in 2011; a court-appointed receiver has spent years clawing back fraudulent transfers (suits reaching ≈\$171M and bribe-recovery actions against a former PDVSA executive), and Armando.info documented a linked ≈\$66.7M of PDVSA insurance funds that vanished into the same offshore structures. Roughly 25,000 PDVSA pensioners were affected; while the Chávez government pledged to cover pensions, retirees protested and a group petitioned U.S. authorities saying they were never made whole. A transition-era restitution framework should treat the pension-fund victims as a recognized claimant class — pursuing the U.S. receivership recoveries, any remaining frozen offshore assets, and the accountability of the PDVSA executives who placed worker savings into the scheme (the individual-accountability dimension runs through the separate confidential Accountability Registry), and folding the workers’ losses into the same restitution-instrument architecture rather than leaving them as orphaned claims.

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Diaspora Return, Professional Credentials & Transitional Justice

Diaspora return and compensation of exiled persons and political prisoners would be integrated into one transitional-justice architecture, since the conditions driving both — personal freedom, security, competitive wages, rule of law — are identical. Compensation would use the same bond mechanism as C.7 (public-debt bonds redeemable against privatization, tradable or convertible into restructured CITGO/IOC equity) rather than a parallel cash scheme. Eligible: arbitrary-detention/torture victims (cross-referenced to C.42 Truth Commission documentation), political prisoners released under the February 2026 amnesty, forced exiles, and victims' families.

Diaspora scale: 7.9M abroad (22% of population, the hemisphere's highest displacement ratio). ODV polling: 44.5% would return if security and economy improve, 95%+ committed to reconstruction; engineers, doctors, technicians, and skilled trades are the critical human capital. Incentives could include lifting judicial measures against activists who fled, repatriated-capital tax relief, expedited residency for diaspora-born children with a Venezuelan parent, transitional housing, and pension-credit recognition via bilateral agreements.

Fast-track foreign-credential recognition is a critical implementation track: Venezuelan universities would validate professional titles awarded abroad (engineers, physicians, attorneys, accountants, dentists, architects, teachers, trades) via curriculum-equivalency boards, expedited exams, and inter-university protocols — replacing the 18–36-month apostille-and-revalidation cycle, and tied into the C.43 public-service network and C.51 medical credentialing. Reconstruction at scale will require imported skilled labor; the diaspora is the most responsive source (cultural fit, language, networks shorten the productivity ramp), and international contractors could be incentivized to prioritize diaspora hiring on capital projects.

1999 Constitution Purification — Repeal of Conflicting TSJ Rulings

200+ Maduro-era TSJ rulings contradict or nullify the 1999 Constitution (override of AN powers, suspension of electoral guarantees, suppression of habeas corpus). Formal reversal would form the legal foundation for transition. The May 5, 2026 TSJ Plenary ratification and the 32-magistrate expansion in process are the operative window for ruling-by-ruling repeal. Cross-reference to Section 04; retained here for sequencing.

Constitutional Referendum

A constitutional referendum could enact fundamental structural reforms that ordinary legislation cannot deliver: a full guarantee and restitution framework for private property; a bicameral Congress with the Senate restored to balance legislative power; the elimination of alternate legislators — the suplente deputies and, in a restored Senate, alternate senators — with vacancies filled through defined succession or special-election rules rather than standing substitutes; a fully nominal congressional electoral system in which every deputy and senator is elected by name in single-member districts, with no party-list nominations; presidential term limits and anti-entrenchment provisions; a five-year electoral period (presidential and legislative terms reduced from six to five years to align with regional democratic norms — Colombia 4, Brazil 4, Chile 4, Mexico 6, Peru 5 — and shorten the entrenchment window between elections); second-round runoff for presidential races absent a first-round majority; elimination of the Executive Vice Presidency and of the sectoral Vice Presidencies (productive, economic, territorial, political, communications, defense) with coordinating responsibilities transferred to the Ministry for the Presidency; enabling of the extradition of nationals for international crimes; redistribution of executive authority to the legislature and judiciary; constitutional rights aligned to economic feasibility; meaningful federalism with autonomy restored to states and municipalities; and a constitutional prohibition on active military participating in political activities.

Anti-Trust & Competition Framework

Modernized anti-trust law and an independent competition authority could reverse the two-decade pattern of state-favored single-supplier arrangements in cement, telecom, banking, and insurance. The framework would align with WTO and bilateral trade-agreement obligations.

Education Sector Reform & Institution Rehabilitation

Public schools declined from approximately 16,000 operational in 1998 to 12,000–13,000 in 2025, with enrollment dropping approximately 30% versus 1998. University enrollment declined from approximately 800,000 to 400–450k. Facility rehabilitation, curriculum modernization, and faculty rebuild would be required across the network. The reform could modernize the public-school curriculum (STEM, civic values, financial literacy, digital skills); authorize private-sector participation at all levels; create a national scholarship program funded by government and private contributions; align accreditation with international benchmarks (QS, WASC, IB); and establish a regulated school-voucher mechanism for low-income families. Competition between public and private providers may be the fastest path to quality recovery.

Technical and vocational training would require its own rehabilitation track, centered on INCES. Founded in 1959 as the Instituto Nacional de Cooperación Educativa (INCE) under Luis Beltrán Prieto Figueroa, it was once a respected pillar of skilled-trade formation — the National Apprenticeship Program, occupational certification, and in-firm training across metalworking, construction, electricity, textiles, agro-industry, and services. Renamed the Instituto Nacional de Capacitación y Educación Socialista in 2008 and restructured under the 2014 INCES Law, its mandate was reframed around “formación política” and the construction of the socialist model (the Batallas Productivas, Poder Popular, the “punto y círculo”), drifting from demand-driven technical instruction toward ideological doctrine even as budgets, equipment, and instructor quality decayed. A restructuring could strip the political-indoctrination mandate and restore INCES as a demand-led skills agency: modernize and re-accredit the apprenticeship-and-certification model, and realign its occupational catalog to the actual skilled-worker demand of the reactivating economy — oil and gas, mining and metals, electricity, construction, and manufacturing. The fastest path would pair in-workplace dual training with private firms (building on the June 10, 2026 INCES–private-university alliance), university articulation, and proven international models such as Germany’s dual system and Colombia’s SENA, so the technician-and-operator pipeline the sector recovery requires is rebuilt rather than improvised. Alongside INCES’s short-cycle role, the reform could promote specialized Associate Degrees in technical schools — reviving the standard set by experiences such as the Escuela Técnica Industrial, modeled on Spain’s Escuela de Maestría Industrial (the formación-profesional-industrial system later codified in Spain’s 1955 Ley de Formación Profesional Industrial). The Education Authority could offer scholarships as an incentive for private Institutos Universitarios that build these specializations into their programs, creating a two-tier pipeline: INCES delivers short-term technical certifications (under one year), while the Institutos Universitarios deliver the longer Associate Degree (about three years). The rationale is acute: the diaspora and more than two decades of disinvestment have hollowed out the skilled-worker base precisely as the new wave of energy, mining, electricity, and industrial investment is generating massive demand for technicians and operators, so rebuilding the technical-education pipeline is a binding precondition for the recovery rather than a long-term aspiration. The reform could also create a recognition-of-experience certification track at the Institutos Universitarios — allowing skilled individuals with demonstrated on-the-job experience but no formal credential to validate and certify their competencies (a recognition-of-prior-learning / “certificación por experiencia” pathway), with government scholarships covering the assessment and any bridging coursework — rapidly formalizing the large pool of self-taught technicians and tradespeople the informal crisis economy produced, and converting undocumented experience into portable, employer-recognized qualifications. Sources: INCES · AVN · UNESCO-SITEAL.

Machado at Harvard (May 12, 2026) — “Beyond Oil: Education for Growth, Inclusion, and Human Flourishing in Venezuela.” Machado delivered the keynote at the Harvard Venezuela Education Conference, organized by Harvard Graduate School of Education’s Education Lab for Latin America (ELLA), presenting the education chapter of her national project *Venezuela Tierra de Gracia*. The proposed model shifts from a centralized state-monopoly system used for political indoctrination to a pluralist, family-centered architecture built on four pillars: (1) a regulated school-voucher mechanism granting autonomy to families to choose between public and private providers; (2) authorization of private-sector participation across all levels of education; (3) a national scholarship program funded jointly by government and private contributions; and (4) accreditation aligned with international benchmarks. Diagnostic context cited by Machado included more than 1 million Venezuelan school-age children out of school, more than half of public schools lacking reliable electricity or running water, and severe teacher attrition. Machado framed Venezuela as positioned to be "the first nation to be built from scratch in the era of artificial intelligence," with AI integrated across sectors. Sources: Boston Globe; El Nacional; El Planeta Boston; La Patilla; Vente Venezuela; El Impulso (all May 11–12, 2026).

Immigration Regulatory Framework

A modernized immigration law plus biometric border-control system, work-visa categories tied to reconstruction-priority sectors, and simplified residency for foreign investors and diaspora-linked applicants. The framework would replace the politicized Saime apparatus.

Prison System Review

Audit of detention facilities (capacity, conditions, due-process status); pre-trial detention reform; dismantlement of the Pranes (organized-crime networks operating inside prisons); alternatives to incarceration for low-severity offenses; compliance with international standards (Mandela Rules) — with international organizations (ICRC, UNODC, and specialized penal-reform bodies) invited to conduct the assessment of the system, so the compliance verdict is independent and credible from the start.

Health Center Rehabilitation

Public hospitals declined from approximately 280 fully operational in 1998 to 120–140 partially operational in 2025 (MSF / PAHO estimate). Equipment and facility rehabilitation; supply-chain restoration; staffing recovery via diaspora return (C.41) and competitive wages. Alongside rehabilitating the public network, the framework could offer incentives (tax relief, expedited permitting, equipment-import facilitation, public-private insurance frameworks) to promote the building of new private health facilities — clinics and hospitals — in the main cities, where private capital and paying demand concentrate. This would let the State concentrate its own rehabilitation resources on the low-income urban and suburban areas — which would be left primarily to local-government management and public provision — while private investment expands urban capacity. The division of labor (private-led in major cities, local-government-led in low-income urban/suburban zones) stretches scarce public funds to where the market will not go and accelerates the overall recovery of health-service capacity.

The framework could also widen coverage on the demand side. The debit card introduced for social transfers (C.66) could double as a health-enrollment and identification instrument: presenting it would admit the cardholder and registered dependents to public hospitals, giving a Medicaid-style program a transparent per-visit cost-and-utilization record rather than untracked free care. In parallel, the transition could restore a strong past practice — broad coverage of formal workers through employer and government insurance plans, made mandatory for entities above a defined employee threshold — and invite insurers to design affordable plans for the uncovered population along the lines of a managed marketplace (an "Obamacare"-style exchange). Informal workers and employees of small businesses could opt into these subsidized plans by enrolling with their income-tax filings, extending coverage beyond the formal payroll while keeping eligibility and cost auditable.

Military Enhancement

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High-command downsizing: FANB has ≈2,000+ generals vs U.S. ≈600, Colombia ≈120, Brazil ≈100 — promotions awarded for political loyalty. Target: a Division-General cap and a merit-based promotion track. The reform could extend into the military-education system itself: a full revision of the educational programs at the military academies — the curriculum (purging political-indoctrination content in favor of professional, doctrinal, technical, and disaster-response instruction), the grading system, and the degree requirements — conducted with required international assistance (allied service academies, NATO-standard curricula advisors, and regional partners) so the reformed programs carry external validation; and an identical, internationally assisted revision of the promotion requirements, so advancement in rank is earned against transparent professional criteria rather than political loyalty, closing the loop between how officers are educated and how they rise. The Bolivarian Militia (≈365,000+), a parallel political force outside the FANB chain, could be eliminated, with personnel offered civilian-reserve options, retraining, or honorable discharge.

Border presence: the current footprint is inadequate against ELN, FARC dissidents, Tren de Aragua (FTO), and Brazilian garimpeiros across Apure/Táchira/Amazonas/Bolívar; the 181,300 km² Arco Minero is effectively under armed-group control. A dedicated Frontier Command could deploy mobile brigades at high-traffic crossings (San Antonio del Táchira, Paraguachón, Puerto Páez, Santa Elena de Uairén), forward bases inside the Arco Minero, and air–river patrol on the Orinoco/Amazon tributaries, with reactivated Colombian/Brazilian coordination. Border security is the precondition for Arco Minero investment under GL 51A/54/55, rural diaspora return, and counter-FTO compliance.

Modernization — the drone force, the military surveillance divisions & AI. This is the moment to modernize the FANB, and the direction would be unmanned and intelligent. The armed forces could create and focus on a dedicated drone force — air, surface-water, and submarine platforms — together with surveillance systems, deliberately lowering the historical dependence on tanks, artillery, and mass infantry. A robust drone capacity would be a great deal of help in national emergencies, disasters, and civil turmoil on top of its defense capability — the June 24 earthquake made that case concretely (the ISR contribution to the relief picture, Section 01). On the same token, an anti-hacking division would be an important force to avoid electronic battles; satellite surveillance may also be a division to develop under the military; and telecom surveillance would likewise be kept under the military. Similarly, a trade-intelligence division within the National Guard component could provide the military with surveillance of the threats to national security arriving through non-legal imports — espionage, counterfeit, banned materials, and environmental damage. Across all of these capabilities, the use of AI would be intensified. The strategy to highlight: keep these potent surveillance tools under the military — away from the non-military organizations more vulnerable to political influence — with military intelligence assisting the judiciary system and the civil security systems under strict procedures (the corresponding reduction of the civilian intelligence bodies' reach is noted at Intelligence Organizations, National Police & Urban Security Restructuring 2.0). These military-intelligence dependencies would themselves sit under tight legislative oversight: the respective standing committee of the National Assembly (defense and security) would exercise continuous supervision of the drone force, the satellite, telecom, and trade-intelligence divisions, the anti-hacking unit, and their surveillance mandates — budget, doctrine, rules of engagement, and the strict-procedure protocols for assisting the judiciary and civilian security — so that concentrating these capabilities inside the armed forces is balanced by democratic control rather than becoming an unchecked surveillance capacity. Force-structure rationalization would accompany the technological shift: the Marine Infantry (Infantería de Marina) could be eliminated as a separate corps and its ground-combat role folded into the Army (Ejército), which already fields and doctrines infantry — removing a duplicated command, logistics, and training pipeline, consolidating amphibious and littoral tasks under a single ground-force branch coordinating with the Navy for sealift, and freeing personnel and budget for the drone, surveillance, and professionalization priorities above. The rationalization follows the same logic as the flag-officer reduction and the Militia's elimination (the Transition (FANB Generals Reduction & Bolivarian Militia Elimination)): fewer redundant structures, better-paid professionals, and a leaner branch map — Army, Navy, Air Force, and National Guard — rather than parallel infantry corps competing for the same mission and payroll.

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Restore international training agreements (WHINSEC, Colombia, Chile, Brazil, Spain, Argentina) suspended under Chavismo; rebuild officer exchanges and advanced-school placements. Active-duty officers in civilian government posts return to military duty (reinforced by the C.46 referendum ban on active-military political activity). Reform the Military Academy (curriculum, admissions, faculty; depoliticization; doctrine, ethics, constitutional law; international accreditation). Civic-integration programs could lend FANB logistics/engineering/medical capacity to civilian education and infrastructure — rebuilding trust in a professional, depoliticized military.

[Updated since the previous issue]

Intelligence Organizations, National Police & Urban Security

SEBIN, DGCIM, and CICPC restructuring: depoliticization; merit-based recruitment and promotion; civilian oversight; restoration of professional intelligence doctrine; FTO compliance vetting (Tren de Aragua, Cartel de los Soles).

Urban security reform is folded into this restructuring (consolidated from the former C.53): the dismantling of colectivos (armed civilian militias), the reestablishment of the state monopoly on the legitimate use of force, and community-policing reform. These are inseparable from the intelligence-and-police overhaul because the colectivos operate as informal auxiliaries of the security apparatus, and a restructured CICPC/national police is the institution that must assume the urban-security functions colectivos illegitimately occupy. The combined effort is a prerequisite for investment-climate normalization. (The motorized dimension of urban crime is addressed in C.39, Traffic & Road Safety.)

Scope note (from the military-modernization design at Military Enhancement): with satellite, telecom, and trade surveillance kept under the military — as the institutions less vulnerable to political influence — the restructured civilian intelligence bodies would carry a deliberately reduced reach, centered on criminal investigation and civilian counterintelligence under civilian oversight, receiving military-intelligence assistance under the strict procedures defined at Military Enhancement.

[Updated since the previous issue]

Traffic & Road Safety + Anti-Bribery at Ports, Airports & Land Transit

A national road safety framework would cover traffic law enforcement, driver licensing reform, vehicle inspection standards, and rehabilitation of road signage and infrastructure. Venezuela's road fatality rate is among the highest in Latin America. The framework should also regulate the surge of motorbikes, mopeds, and electric scooters: as trade reopens, these could become a massive import category that further congests already-chaotic streets and worsens road-safety outcomes, so licensing, registration, helmet, and lane rules — paired with a deliberately high import tariff that both raises revenue and dampens unrestrained purchase — would be prudent. A structured anti-corruption education program could target customs, immigration, port, and airport officials, with integration to the SENIAT customs automation program essential to eliminate manual processes that enable corrupt transactions.

Beyond the official-facing program, a sound, sustained national anti-corruption campaign engaging the whole of society would be needed to shift the underlying culture. After two decades in which corruption became normalized as a survival and advancement strategy across both the public and private spheres, enforcement and automation alone are insufficient; durable change requires a generational, society-wide effort. Such a campaign could combine public-integrity education from the school curriculum upward (civic ethics, the social cost of corruption), mass-communication and media engagement that reframes corruption as theft from the community rather than a victimless workaround, citizen-reporting and whistleblower-protection channels, transparency-by-default in public procurement and budgets (open-data portals, published contracts), and visible, even-handed prosecution that demonstrates accountability reaches the powerful — paired with the salary-scale reform in C.57 (adequate, dignified public pay reduces the economic pressure that rationalizes petty graft). The private sector, civil society, religious and community organizations, universities, and the diaspora would

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all be enlisted: corruption is a whole-of-society problem and cannot be solved by the state alone. This is a long-horizon cultural project, not a single statute, and would underpin the credibility of every other reform in this Agenda.

The single largest road-safety problem, concentrated in Caracas, is the excess and chaos of motorcycles (motorizados) — at once a road-safety emergency and a crime-and-public-order issue (the crime dimension links to Urban Security Reform, Section 04). On safety, the Observatorio de Seguridad Vial (OSV) recorded at least 1,244 road deaths and 4,331 injured nationwide in the first ten months of 2025, with roughly half the fatalities (609, ≈48.95%) being motorcyclists; the 2025 toll already exceeds all of 2024 (1,373 deaths, 572 motorcyclists). Officials have put motorcycle involvement in traffic accidents as high as 60% (Interior Minister, Feb 2025), and rescue services report that in Caracas at least ten fatal accidents a week occur, more than 80% involving motorcycles, while motorcycle-trauma cases push hospital emergency-room occupancy above 80%. The WHO ratio cited locally is ≈72 deaths per 100,000 motorcycles versus ≈13 per 100,000 cars; victims skew heavily to young men under 26. On crime, the motorcycle has long been the instrument of choice for armed robbery, snatch-theft, and contract violence in the capital (riders using full-face helmets to avoid identification), and the colectivo phenomenon is itself motorized — the security-apparatus-linked groups that gate the broader reform. The fleet has ballooned: roughly 800,000 motorcycles sold in 2024, with ≈450,000 more in 2025 across at least 15 assemblers. The policy lever the government has reached for is the import channel: rather than a clean historical ban, Caracas has used import restrictions, tariffs, and national-parts-integration mandates — most recently (November 2025) raising the tariff on imported moto autoparts to 20%, which roughly doubled street prices (from ≈$800–900 to ≈$2,000) and is projected to cut 2025 sales by ≈50% year-on-year, alongside a parts-localization alliance signed by the Industry Ministry. The historical reference point is that supply-side import-and-parts control has measurably slowed the fleet's growth and raised prices, even if it works slowly and imperfectly and never amounted to a decisive prohibition. A transition-era urban-security framework would pair demand-side enforcement (traffic-law enforcement after the dissolution of the dedicated traffic-vigilance corps, helmet and registration rules, dedicated motorcycle lanes on highways, identification requirements) with calibrated supply-side import/tariff policy and the de-militarization of the colectivo networks. Sources: Observatorio de Seguridad Vial · El Nacional.

Border Security & Rural Zones

ELN, FARC dissident groups, Tren de Aragua, and garimpeiros operate in the border zones. Securing the Apurí, Táchira, Amazonas, and Bolívar borders would be prerequisite for Arco Minero investment and diaspora return to rural areas. The current FANB footprint along Venezuela's land borders is structurally inadequate for the threat environment; a permanent military presence — new operational units stationed at the high-traffic crossings and forward operating bases inside the Arco Minero — would be required to reestablish state control. Detailed force structure is sequenced under C.56.

Cement Privatization

CEMEX, Holcim, and Lafarge operations were nationalized 2008–2011. Venezuelan cement production collapsed from 12M t/yr peak to below 3M t/yr by 2024. Privatization could restore capacity, attract foreign capital, and lower construction cost — a critical input for the reconstruction-cycle thesis. Privatization could also recover the end product's quality — which first assessments of the buildings affected by the June 24 earthquakes suggest was lost after nationalization — restoring cement standards as a seismic-safety matter, not only an industrial one.

Telecom Privatization — CANTV & Movilnet

Privatization would be sequenced under the unified reform framework. Full-stack replacement of obsolete Chinese-built infrastructure (ZTE, CEIEC, Huawei) implies a larger addressable opportunity than a typical privatization, since the rebuild is greenfield rather than incremental upgrade. Spectrum re-auction and tower-infrastructure consolidation could be the operative early entry points.

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Strategic Telecom & Satellite Infrastructure Audit

Independent forensic audit of three asset clusters of foreign-built strategic telecom and space infrastructure inherited from the Chavez–Maduro period would be required before any post-transition continuation, replacement, or decommissioning decision. The ALBA-1 submarine cable (Venezuela ↔ Cuba ↔ Jamaica) is a TGC joint venture (60% Telecom Venezuela / 40% Cuba Telco Transbit) built by Alcatel-Lucent Shanghai Bell; required actions could include reviewing the JV structure and Cuba's 40% stake, auditing equipment / software / traffic-inspection capability with U.S. and allied (FVEY-aligned) technical assistance, and resolving the decision matrix on continuation, decommissioning, or U.S. / allied-built replacement. The Captain Manuel Ríos aerospace base in Guárico is the primary control station for VENESAT-1, VRSS-1, and VRSS-2 (backup at Manikuyá fort, Bolívar State), with equipment supplied by Chinese state contractors (CASC, CGWIC); required actions could include forensic audit by allied experts for unauthorized data-relay paths and embedded backdoors, review of Chinese personnel access, and decommissioning of Chinese-supplied subsystems where security risk is confirmed. The orbital assets and successor-satellite procurement track covers the entire portfolio (Simón Bolívar VENESAT-1, Francisco de Miranda VRSS-1, Antonio José de Sucre VRSS-2) built and operated under bilateral cooperation agreements with China, with the Guaicaipuro successor and the 2023 ILRS accession extending the dependency; required actions could include immediate suspension of the Guaicaipuro procurement and the ILRS accession, remaining-life telemetry and orbital-control audit of active Chinese-built satellites, opening of future procurement to U.S. and allied bidders (Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, Airbus, Thales Alenia Space, OHB) on transparent competitive terms, and full disclosure of all China cooperation terms and technology-transfer obligations.

Major Infrastructure Maintenance — Viaducts, Highways, Railways, Bridges

National maintenance backlog inventory and sequenced rehabilitation under concession structures with multilateral co-financing. Specifically, the main bridges and trunk highways could be offered as concessions covering operation, toll collection, and maintenance — a self-financing model in which a private concessionaire maintains and operates the asset and recovers its investment through regulated tolls, rather than relying on scarce public maintenance budgets. The model fits Venezuela's major inter-urban corridors and high-traffic bridges (which carry enough volume to support toll-backed concessions) and is standard across Latin America. The asset-by-asset list of bridge and highway concession candidates is maintained in the Privatization Schedule; see that document for details. Toll levels would be regulated with protections for essential/low-income mobility, and concession contracts re-tendered transparently given the corruption legacy of prior road contracts.

In the immediate post-earthquake period, this maintenance-and-concession track acquires a new first priority: the viaducts, highways, bridges, ports, and rail and water-supply structures damaged by the June 24 doublet. A transition infrastructure program would need to triage and prioritize the earthquake-damaged assets — beginning with the access routes, bridges, and lifeline structures serving La Guaira, Caracas, and the central-coast disaster zone — for emergency structural assessment, stabilization, and reconstruction ahead of the routine backlog, coordinating with the building-habitability commission (the Transition (Applying for Multilateral Credit Facilities)) and sequencing reconstruction so that rebuilt assets meet current seismic codes rather than restoring the pre-quake vulnerability. Multilateral recovery financing (CAF, IDB) and the GL 60 humanitarian channel would be the natural funding sources for this emergency tranche.

A flagship discrete project is the completion of the third bridge over the Orinoco River. Venezuela has two existing Orinoco crossings — the Angostura bridge (1967, Ciudad Bolívar) and the Orinoquia bridge (2006, Ciudad Guayana) — and a third, begun in 2006 to connect Caicara del Orinoco (Bolívar) with Cabruta (Guárico), remains unfinished at roughly 60% completion after the Brazilian contractor Odebrecht collapsed and abandoned it (the metal superstructure was fabricated domestically at Vhicoa/Ciudad Guayana). As designed it is an ≈11 km total / ≈3.2 km over-water bimodal (road + rail)

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structure linking the south (Bolívar/Amazonas mining-and-oil zones) to the central plains and north — cutting freight routes by 150+ km and advancing national integration. A transition-era infrastructure program could prioritize its completion under a transparent concession or multilateral-co-financed contract (re-tendered cleanly given the Odebrecht corruption legacy), with the unfinished asset and fabricated components inventoried. It pairs naturally with the rail-rehabilitation track (C.74) and the CVG/steel reactivation (C.21, the domestic source of the structural steel). Sources: El Pitazo · Banca y Negocios.

Privatization of Airport & Port Operations — Concession / Revenue-Sharing

Venezuela's international airports and seaports are state-operated and badly under-maintained, yet they are among the most readily concessionable assets in the economy — revenue-generating, with clear performance metrics, and a deep global precedent base (airport and port concessions are standard across Latin America: Aerodom in the Dominican Republic, the Lima and Quito airport concessions, the Colombian and Peruvian port terminals). Rather than outright sale, the operations could be transferred to private/international operators under long-term concession, operating-agreement, or revenue-sharing structures, with the underlying assets remaining state-owned during the transition (capturing the recovery upside per the Privatization Schedule disposition logic). The scope spans the principal international airports — Maiquetía (Simón Bolívar, Caracas), Maracaibo (La Chinita), Valencia, Barcelona (José Antonio Anzoátegui), Maturín, Porlamar (Del Caribe, Margarita), Barquisimeto, San Antonio del Táchira, and the Josefa Camejo (Punto Fijo) — and the principal ports — Puerto Cabello (the country's largest), La Guaira, Maracaibo, Puerto La Cruz/Guanta, Guaranao, El Guamache (Margarita), and the Orinoco river ports (Puerto Ordaz, Matanzas, Palúa) serving the CVG mining-industrial complex. Concessioning would modernize terminals, restore safety and FAA/ICAO and ISPS port-security standing (a prerequisite for the aviation reopening, cf. Headlines aviation items), and re-establish the logistics backbone for trade, tourism, and diaspora travel. The full asset-by-asset inventory — with size, location, status, and disposition note — is maintained in the Privatization Schedule (a Miranda Institute Publication); see it for details. Sequenced with the customs-automation (C.38) and anti-bribery (C.39) tracks, since ports and airports are the principal corruption-exposure chokepoints.

Train & Metro Rehabilitation & Concession

Caracas Metro (1983): partial service. Maracaibo Metro: effectively suspended. IFE inter-city rail: Caracas–Cúa partially operational; Tinaco–Anaco interrupted (≈70% complete). Full rehabilitation across the national network would require $3–5B.

Beyond rehabilitation, both the Caracas Metro (El Metro de Caracas) and the national train system (IFE — Instituto de Ferrocarriles del Estado) are candidates for privatization under long-term concession. El Metro — the capital's mass-transit backbone, with multiple lines and a large but decayed rolling-stock fleet — could be concessioned to a private/international operator that finances rehabilitation, modernization, and operation in exchange for regulated fare revenue and an operating term, with the system itself remaining state-owned during the transition (the Santiago, Lima, and São Paulo metro-concession models are precedents; fare subsidies preserved for low-income riders). The IFE train network (the existing Caracas–Cúa line plus the stalled Tinaco–Anaco and other corridors) could likewise be offered as a build/rehabilitate-operate-transfer concession, packaging the unfinished and operational segments together. Concessioning shifts the multi-billion capex off the public balance sheet and brings operating discipline, while the State retains the assets and sets service and tariff standards. Asset-by-asset detail is in the Privatization Schedule. Sequenced with the broader infrastructure-concession program (C.73) and the airport/port concessions (C.73.1).

National Served-Water & Wastewater Systems

System capacity fell from 160,000 L/sec in 2000 to approximately 55,000 L/sec — a 65% collapse — and most households receive intermittent service on rationing cycles of days or weeks, pushing families toward roof tanks, cisterns, and informal trucked water at multiples of the tariff. What the served-water program should accomplish, in sequence: (1) a

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national audit of the system — sources and reservoirs, treatment plants, pumping stations (the Tuy I–IV system serving Caracas above all), trunk aqueducts, and distribution grids — folding in the post-earthquake damage assessment across the seven states where the network failed after June 24; (2) an emergency rehabilitation tranche that restores the highest-yield assets first (pumps, motors, electrical feeds, chlorination) to lift delivered volume quickly; (3) continuity targets — moving urban service from rationing toward 24/7 supply, with published service-level indicators per hidrológica so progress is measurable; (4) potability restoration — reliable treatment-chemical supply, laboratory certification, and public water-quality reporting to WHO standards; (5) loss reduction — non-revenue water (physical leaks plus unbilled consumption) likely exceeds half of production, so network repair and near-universal metering would carry a first-order payback; (6) the used-water side — rebuilding the wastewater system in parallel: rehabilitating collection networks and pumping, restoring and completing the largely abandoned treatment plants (only a small fraction of Venezuela's sewage is treated; most discharges run raw into rivers, the Caribbean littoral, and the emblematic cases of the Guaire river and Lake Valencia, whose recovery would be the program's visible flagship), setting industrial pre-treatment and discharge standards, and sequencing sanitation coverage with the potable-water works so both networks are rebuilt street by street in one intervention; (7) institutional restructuring — decentralizing the hidrológicas into operable regional units under performance contracts, opening management contracts and concessions to private operators across both water and sanitation; and (8) the financing frame — rehabilitation of the potable side alone would require $8–15B over 5–10 years, with wastewater adding a further multi-billion tranche, viable only with the phased tariff framework with low-income protections (C.64) as prerequisite for private concession investment, supplemented by multilateral water-and-sanitation lending (CAF, IDB) and by reconstruction funds where earthquake damage overlaps the rehabilitation footprint.

IPOSTEL Modernization & Privatization (National Postal & Logistics

IPOSTEL — the national post office (autonomous institute since 1977) — has decayed badly, losing relevance to private couriers (MRW, Domesa, Zoom, DHL/FedEx/UPS), but retains valuable assets: a near-universal municipal real-estate footprint, exclusive postage/certification authority, the philatelic base, and Universal Postal Union (UPU) treaty standing. Modernization would pair infrastructure rehab (priority offices, mail-tracking digitization, courier-API last-mile, parcel-sorting capacity) with digital services (address certification, document legalization, e-signature, coordinated with SAREN). Privatization options: full IPO of a logistics holding with a state-retained minority Universal Service Obligation (Royal Mail / Deutsche Post DHL / Correos Chile precedent); regional-network concessions with state-retained real estate; or a hybrid keeping philatelic/sovereign-certification in a small residual public entity (which preserves UPU standing) while fully privatizing logistics. Benefits: recovery of stranded real estate, integration with reconstruction/agricultural/mining supply chains (C.34, C.10, C.73), and a fiscal-recovery line. A specific, high-value mandate to assign the incoming concessionaire is the construction and maintenance of a reliable national address database — Venezuela lacks a standardized, georeferenced postal-address registry (a gap that cripples e-commerce last-mile delivery, financial-services KYC, emergency response, electoral logistics, and the diaspora-return and document-issuance tracks, cf. the SAIME/identity problem). The postal operator is the natural custodian of such a registry (the global precedent — Royal Mail's PAF, USPS, Correos); making the address-database build an explicit deliverable of the concession (with open-data access for permitted public and private uses) turns IPOSTEL's municipal footprint into the backbone of national logistics and digital-government addressing. Sequenced after the C.5 banking-privatization track, aligned with C.57 state rationalization.

Desalination Plants

Coastal and island water-supply restoration through an international concession framework.

Environmental Protection Framework

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Modernized framework aligned with Minamata, Paris, and IUCN standards. EIA ex-ante for all extractive contracts. Indigenous FPIC. Cross-cuts C.10, C.19, and C.20.

Fuel Price Adjustments 2.0 — Gasoline, Distillate, LPG

Gasoline runs a two-tier system: subsidized $0.10/L (≈$0.38/gal) for the first 120 L/month for Carnet de la Patria holders, then $0.50/L (≈$1.89/gal) above quota and at international-priced stations. Subsidy cost is approximately $2–3B/year (≈23% of non-oil fiscal revenue) and is equal across income brackets — highly regressive. Reference points: post-Hormuz U.S. average approximately $4.50/gal; Colombia approximately $3.50/gal; Peru approximately $5/gal. Border-state black-market gasoline (Táchira / Zulia $0.80–0.90/L from Colombia; Delta Amacuro up to $3/L) signals breakdown of the controlled-price structure at distribution scale. Debit-card targeting for low-income households could be the wiser solution. A structural benefit of moving to market or near-market prices is that it would sharply curb the cross-border fuel smuggling (bachaqueo de combustible) along the Colombian and Brazilian frontiers: the smuggling is driven entirely by the price differential — heavily subsidized Venezuelan fuel resold at a large markup across the border — so once domestic prices approach regional levels the arbitrage collapses and the contraband traffic that drains supply and funds irregular networks largely disappears. LPG: the 10 kg cylinder costs under $0.50 USD (vs Colombia $8–12 and Peru $10–15); cylinder shortages drive queues and black-market premiums; tariff correction is essential. Normalization would be prerequisite for an IMF program.

Electricity Tariff Revision

Effective tariffs of 0.00–0.02 USD/kWh and distribution losses of approximately 25–30% (vs Latin American average 10–15%). Anti-theft enforcement would be the condition precedent for any PPP or concession structure.

Water Tariff Revision

System capacity is approximately 55,000 L/sec (collapsed from 160,000 in 2000); per-capita supply is approximately 80 L/day (WHO minimum 50). Phased correction toward Latin American benchmarks would be prerequisite for water PPPs.

Price Liberalization, Subsidy Reform & Tariff Review

End across-the-board price controls inherited from the 2014 Ley de Precios Justos. Means-tested debit-card targeting for low-income households could replace universal subsidies. Sectoral tariff review (electricity, water, gas, fuel — see C.62–C.64) under a cost-recovery framework.

Crypto Activity Assessment — Formalization & Tariff Design

Venezuela ranks 9th globally in per-capita cryptocurrency adoption and 18th overall (Chainalysis 2025). USDT stablecoins are used daily for groceries, medicine, and remittances. In April 2026, the Venezuelan government announced a halt to all crypto-mining operations citing the national electricity shortage — bringing the sector's grid-load dimension to the center of the policy debate and reinforcing that any formalization could only proceed in parallel with an industrial-electricity solution for the sector. The required actions are: audit and formalization of the crypto sector under transparent licensing / AML / CFT framework aligned with FATF; design of a differentiated industrial electricity tariff for crypto-mining operations using stranded hydro output in Bolívar State or own (off-grid) thermoelectric plants; and formal resolution of the Petro (2018) legacy instrument.

Tourism Infrastructure Plan

Venezuela's tourism infrastructure collapsed after 2002. Priority areas: Margarita Island, Los Roques, Canaima, Angel Falls corridor, the Andes circuit, and Orinoco ecotourism. Sequencing: investment in tourism assets and active international promotion would be postponed until basic infrastructure (electricity, water, road network, urban services) has been rehabilitated to functioning standard and security has been restored to internationally acceptable benchmarks (homicide rate, kidnapping incidence, urban policing). Domestic tourism could recover earlier on a self-organizing basis; international tourism, which depends on consular advisories and travel insurance availability, is likely to lag the security normalization curve by five to seven years and should not be marketed in advance of those preconditions. The June 24 earthquake adds a further negative layer: destroyed and damaged coastal infrastructure, a degraded gateway airport, and months of disaster imagery will keep Venezuela classified as a risk-premium destination on travel platforms, advisories, and insurance pricing — surcharged, warning-flagged, and effectively priced out of mainstream itineraries — for years after the emergency ends, so earthquake-damage recovery joins the list of preconditions to be verified before any brand relaunch: basic infrastructure, security benchmarks, and now the physical and reputational repair of the quake-hit littoral. Restarting international marketing of the "Venezuela" destination brand before the underlying conditions reach top international standards would be a strategic mistake — premature campaigns would attract under-prepared visitors into a still-developing service base, generate negative reviews and incident reporting at scale, and damage the destination brand for a decade. The brand reset should be sequenced *after* the underlying tourism stack — security, transport, accommodation, public health, consular access, and earthquake-damage recovery — is independently verified as meeting top international standards.

Fishing Sector Development & Territorial-Sea Surveillance

Coastal and Orinoco-basin fisheries restoration; quota framework; international cold-chain partnerships. Venezuela's northeastern coast (Sucre, Nueva Esparta, the Paria Peninsula, Margarita) and northwestern coast (Falcón, Zulia, the Gulf of Venezuela) together represent a significant underutilized potential for both artisanal seafood production and industrial fishing — covering pelagic species, demersal stocks, shrimp, and shellfish — provided activity is conducted under modern ecosystem-preservation standards (catch quotas, gear restrictions, marine-protected-area enforcement, bycatch reduction, and mangrove and coral-reef conservation aligned with FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries). The institutional framework could pair a modernized INSOPESCA with regional university partnerships (Universidad de Oriente, LUZ) for stock assessment, training, and scientific oversight, while creating commercial conditions for processing-plant investment (Cumaná, Carúpano, Punto Fijo) and cold-chain export logistics. International partnerships with Norwegian, Spanish, and Japanese fisheries-development authorities could provide technical assistance on sustainable-stock management and certification systems. A companion enforcement action would restore maritime surveillance capacity to collect the fishing fee owed by international vessels operating in Venezuela's territorial sea and exclusive economic zone — coastal radar, AIS/VMS vessel-tracking integration, and coast-guard patrol coverage sufficient to identify foreign-flagged fleets, verify licensing, and enforce fee collection, which both funds the modernized INSOPESCA framework and curbs the illegal, unreported fishing that has depleted stocks under the current enforcement gap.

[Updated since the previous issue]

Data Center Sector — International Investment

Plan now; deploy once capacity grows. The Caroní hydroelectric complex is the structural foundation, but current available capacity (≈13 GW) matches peak consumption and leaves zero resilience margin. Data center FID is likely to require incremental capacity from Caroní rehabilitation and grid transmission upgrade. Bolívar may offer the strongest hemisphere data-center thesis on a five-year horizon — low-cost hydro plus stranded industrial real estate plus the AI-infrastructure demand on energy-rich economies that BlackRock / Larry Fink cited as a primary positioning driver (Section 02 item 7).

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Agricultural Incentives

A genuine recovery of the Venezuelan agricultural sector would require coordinated action on land tenure (legal title clarity, reversal of the post-2001 Ley de Tierras expropriations), credit access (rural lending lines through privatized commercial banks per C.5 plus a specialized agricultural-development institution), irrigation and water infrastructure (the deteriorated systems in Guárico, Portuguesa, and Barinas would need rehabilitation), input supply (fertilizer, seeds, machinery imports under streamlined customs procedures aligned with C.38), and cold-chain and logistics modernization (transport corridors, refrigerated warehousing, port handling for perishables). Priority products with the strongest export potential would receive the most concentrated incentive support: cocoa (fine-aroma Venezuelan cocoa commands premium pricing in European and Japanese specialty markets), coffee (Andean-zone arabica quality with strong specialty-market potential), shrimp and aquaculture (existing Pacific-style production base in Zulia and Falcón), sugarcane derivatives (rum exports, biofuel feedstock), cattle and poultry (regional supply potential), banana and plantain, corn, and citrus fruits. Historical context: in 1987 Venezuelan non-oil agricultural exports totaled only $496M — far below Colombia ($3,603M), Ecuador ($1,786M), and Costa Rica ($1,699M); the long-term ceiling is structural rather than agronomic. Domestic food-security recovery would accompany export-focused activity rather than be subordinated to it. Land tenure, logistics, irrigation, cold chain, and export financing would need to be addressed simultaneously. Forestry (Maderas del Orinoco / MAVETUR, Uverito plantation) sits adjacent to the agricultural framework but is structurally distinct — it is treated under C.21 (heavy industry / forestry reactivation) given the JV-unwinding question, the Saab-network accountability dimension covered in the separate confidential Accountability Registry, and the integration with the Caroní complementary energy framework. Coordination between C.21 forestry policy and C.34 land-tenure and rural-credit reform would be essential for rural communities in southern Anzoátegui and Monagas where the Uverito footprint overlaps with traditional agricultural use.

Pharma & Food Multinational Reopening

Reverse the 2013–2025 exit cycle (Pfizer, Sanofi, Bayer, Novartis, Clorox, Kellogg’s, Kimberly-Clark). Conditions: FX convertibility, price-control elimination, regulatory predictability. Cross-references the C.7 restitution framework. Targeted incentives for the return of large pharmaceutical multinationals could include accelerated regulatory pathway and INVIMA / SACS expedited review for previously approved molecules, transitional manufacturing-localization tax credits, IP-protection guarantees aligned with TRIPS Plus standards, repatriation-of-profits guarantees, and dedicated USD-denominated invoicing channels for imported active pharmaceutical ingredients. The pharma sector is the most strategically sensitive of the multinational exits because the supply gap directly affects mortality and morbidity outcomes; the C.51 health-center rehabilitation track and the C.36 pharma-return track would be sequenced together so that distribution capacity matches restored supply.

National Emergency-Preparedness Overhaul

The June 24 doublet exposed two decades without a functioning civil-protection system — and the next emergency (an epidemic, major flooding, forest fires, a new earthquake episode) will not announce itself. A newly elected government could run a full assessment and tune-up in five movements. First, the assessment: a published audit of what June 24 revealed — alerts, seismic monitoring, hospital surge capacity, search-and-rescue, shelter logistics, command-and-control. Second, international assistance to design a thorough national plan to recognized standards — the agencies that ran the response (UNDRR, OCHA, allied civil-protection corps, the Israeli Home Front Command model, Chile’s and Mexico’s seismic agencies), with the UNDRR report (the Transition (Preserving Monómeros)) as baseline. Third, a Disaster Law assigning roles before the event: municipal and state responsibilities, the national civil-protection authority, the armed forces’ support function under civilian direction, a legal doorway for local and international volunteer participation, and pre-authorized emergency-procurement and international-assistance protocols so the first 72 hours are not spent on paperwork. Fourth, prevention: a standing program of precaution tasks — seismic retrofit priorities from the

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habitability triage (the Transition (Applying for Multilateral Credit Facilities)), flood-zone and slope management, land-use enforcement — paired with an educational program placing disaster preparedness in the school curriculum with annual national drills. Fifth, a periodic municipal inspection regime — statutory, every five to ten years — certifying public and private buildings against the seismic code, with published registries so the market prices risk. Funded through the multilateral disaster-risk windows (the Transition (Applying for Multilateral Credit Facilities)), the overhaul converts the doublet's lesson into an institutional legacy.

Public-Service Media

Public-service media — converting state broadcasters into independent public networks (Democracia TV & Valores Venezuela TV). A cornerstone of the cultural and civic-information reform would be the conversion of the state-media apparatus (VTV, teleSUR, TVes, ViVe, ANTV, RNV, YVKE Mundial, La Radio del Sur, Correo del Orinoco, and related outlets — see the Privatization Schedule, A.4.3) from a propaganda system into an independent Public Service Media Corporation, modeled on the BBC and Spain's RTVE: funded through a transparent annual congressional appropriation, governed by an independent board appointed by the National Assembly with staggered terms, protected from executive interference, subject to external audits, and required to provide balanced news, educational programming, and public-interest broadcasting. The proposal splits the corporation into two networks.

The first, provisionally named **Democracia TV** (Venezuela's civic/public-affairs network) (a Public-Affairs and Civic-Information Network on the C-SPAN model), would be built largely on a converted ANTV and would be dedicated to broadcasting National Assembly sessions, TSJ/Supreme Court hearings, CNE electoral-authority announcements, public audits, government reports, public-procurement hearings, and civic-educational programming. It would be funded through the national budget but governed by an independent board appointed by a supermajority of the National Assembly, with guaranteed editorial autonomy, mandatory external audits, and equal-access rules for government and opposition voices. As a higher-editorial-independence platform serving the National Assembly, the Executive (including the military), the Attorney General, the Comptroller General (Contraloría General), the National Electoral Council, the Ombudsman (Defensoría del Pueblo), and the Caracas-area municipalities (Libertador, Chacao, Baruta, El Hatillo), it would make the institutions' proceedings transparent and verifiable. Radio Nacional de Venezuela (RNV) would be transferred into this corporation, preserving and disseminating Venezuelan rule of law and best civic practices.

The second, provisionally named **Valores Venezuela TV** (Venezuela's cultural network), would be a cultural and heritage network dedicated to Venezuela's traditions, artistic expression, and the country's musical, folkloric, and regional diversity — with an explicit mandate to highlight underrepresented voices in Venezuelan society (ViVe and the cultural RNV channels could fold into it). The budgets for both Democracia TV and Valores Venezuela TV would sit within the Ministry of Culture's allocation, but their independence would be protected by a governing board drawn from outstanding individuals across Venezuelan society (academia, the arts, journalism, civil society), not political appointees — the funding line is public, the editorial control is not governmental. Together Democracia TV and Valores Venezuela TV replace a captured state-media system with a transparent, independent public-service-media architecture.

Both networks could also pursue carriage beyond Venezuela — as non-profit public-service channels — on major distribution platforms abroad, beginning with U.S. carriers such as Comcast/Xfinity and Verizon Fios and extending to operators in Spain, Colombia, and other countries with large Venezuelan diaspora communities (for example Movistar and Claro), so that the 7.9M diaspora retains direct access to civic and cultural programming from home and the networks build an international public-service footprint. In particular, the converted corporation could take over and repurpose the active broadcasting and carriage licenses under which teleSUR currently airs on U.S. and other foreign networks — inheriting an existing international distribution footprint rather than building one from scratch, and redirecting that reach from state messaging toward independent civic and cultural programming.

National Academies & Diaspora Advisory Networks

The Academia Nacional de Ciencias Económicas (ANCE) and Academia de Ciencias Políticas y Sociales (ACPyS) could be activated as formal advisory bodies on economic, legal, and institutional reform — both have published substantive work throughout the Chavez–Maduro period, accumulating two decades of underutilized reform scholarship.

The advisory function could extend to diaspora professionals via remote/hybrid formats, even for those not planning physical return — a near-zero-cost knowledge multiplier drawing on senior diaspora economists, jurists, central bankers, and regulators. Three vehicles: (a) think tanks inviting diaspora professionals as remote fellows or research chairs with deliverables tied to specific reform tracks; (b) science academies (ANCE, ACPyS, the physical-sciences and medicine academies) extending corresponding membership to diaspora scholars by remote participation; (c) corporate boards and technical committees of Venezuelan firms (private, restructured-state, hybrid) including diaspora directors on a remote basis. International contractors, restructured state enterprises (CITGO, CVG, PDVSA), and the C.43 network could embed this model.

Academy input could feed key institutional-renewal processes — CNE rector nominations (C.45/C.47), the Attorney General, Comptroller, Ombudsman, and BCV governance (C.3) — as technical review bodies whose published assessments enter the public deliberation record, without replacing constitutional civil-society nomination committees.

The Nonprofit Sector as Social-Policy Partner

Some of the most effective social work in Venezuela — through the collapse, the emergency, and the recovery — has been done by nonprofit organizations and churches, and an elected government could make that a design principle. Amplified by social media — or perhaps because of it, since visibility now flows to demonstrated work — NPOs hold a key role in the best unfolding of many social issues: the care of abandoned children; abandoned animals; elderly citizens living alone; food and medicine distribution to those in need; education in values; specialized education for the impaired; environmental protection; accompaniment of hospitalized people; and the health struggles clinical systems alone do not reach — smoking, alcohol, suicide, depression, and betting addiction among them. They bring what no ministry can requisition: sensitivity, passion, commitment, and volunteers who find deeper reward assisting others from private initiative than they would as public servants. Policy could meet them with a deliberate architecture — government and corporate responsibility converging on proven organizations through direct aids, public awards that unlock private giving, competitive grants with light but real reporting, and, structurally, service-level agreements that formally assign social responsibilities to proven NPOs and churches: the state defines the outcome and standard, funds the service, audits results (the oversight of Item Budget Law & Public-Funds Oversight extends here), and lets the organization deliver with its own people and ethos, with corporate co-responsibility encouraged through matching-grant treatment in the tax redesign (Item Tax Reform 2.0). The test is track record, not affiliation; the safeguard is transparency, not control — and the prize is a delivery network that already exists, already works, and costs a fraction of its bureaucratic equivalent. The same architecture could be opened deliberately to international nonprofits, and the incentive should be explicit: established foreign organizations would be encouraged to open Venezuelan chapters, or to enter joint ventures with proven local NPOs, through fast-track legal registration and a stable operating framework, tax and customs treatment for imported programme materials and equipment, eligibility for the same competitive grants and service-level agreements available to domestic organizations, and — decisively, given the record — a guarantee against the arbitrary deregistration, asset seizure, and criminalization that drove much of the international sector out of the country. The joint-venture route deserves the sharper incentive of the two: pairing an international organization's funding, methodology, and technical standards with a local organization's field access and legitimacy transfers capability rather than merely importing it, and leaves an institution behind when the programme ends. This is also the fastest available route to reconstruction-scale social delivery — the earthquake response demonstrated both the reach of foreign relief organizations and the absence of any standing framework for them to operate beyond an emergency — and it converts the NGO-control statutes marked for repeal at Item Statutory

Realignment from a negative agenda item into a positive one.

[Updated since the previous issue]

National School of Public Service & School of Neighbors

A National School of Public Service could select, train, and develop senior civil servants for the reconstructed state. Closest precedent: France's ENA (1945, de Gaulle), reformed in 2022 into the Institut National du Service Public (INSP). The Venezuelan model: competitive entry (internal/external tracks); an 18–24-month program in administration, economics, law, ethics, and placements; sector rotation; partnerships with INSP (France), ENAP (Chile), ESAP (Colombia); merit-based placement; priority recruitment of returning diaspora professionals; IDB curriculum and concessional-financing support.

Delivery could run through a contracted network of Venezuelan universities (UCV, USB, ULA, UDO, LUZ, UCAB, UNIMET, IESA, regional universities) under common standards, joint exam boards, and shared faculty — multiplying access, capturing diaspora returnees in their home regions, and using idle academic capacity. The World Bank (which financed successful 1990s teacher-enhancement programs in Venezuela) is a natural sponsor for curriculum, faculty stipends, scholarships, and a digital-delivery backbone. Sequenced under C.1.

The School of Neighbors (Escuela de Vecinos) is a complementary program promoting citizen participation in township committees, training community leaders in municipal governance, budgeting, transparency, and civic deliberation, and creating a pipeline from neighborhood participation to municipal/regional leadership — rebuilding the civic infrastructure that clientelistic mobilization (Carnet de la Patria, Cuadrantes de Paz) dismantled.

Cultural Sector Restructuring — National Cultural Plan

A National Cultural Plan could restructure a sector degraded across two decades — politicized museums and libraries, funding collapse, and diaspora loss of artists — degradation consistent with the complex-humanitarian-emergency criteria advocated for Venezuela (HRW, Johns Hopkins, UNSC members, April 2019) though never formally UN-declared.

The Plan would strengthen Venezuelan identity, reunify a polarized society, and embed inclusion and tolerance, treating the 7.9M diaspora (≈one-third of the population) as a distributed cultural asset. Priorities: diaspora-inclusive curatorial boards; bilingual programming; protection of indigenous, Afro-Venezuelan, and regional traditions; diaspora-youth connection through language, history, music, cuisine, civic memory; and anti-polarization standards in public programming. Scope: governance of the Galería de Arte Nacional, Museo de Bellas Artes, Museo de Arte Contemporáneo, and Biblioteca Nacional; transparent restoration of cultural budgets; PPPs for cultural infrastructure; heritage preservation; and support for independent publishing, film, and performing arts. UNESCO technical cooperation is non-financial and available independent of IMF/WB/IDB re-engagement.

Arts initiation via a renovated National Child Institute: the INAM/IDENA legacy network of protective homes, recreational and youth centers — reassigned or repurposed for political mobilization under Chavismo — could anchor a structured arts-initiation program (visual arts, drawing, painting, sculpture, theater, dance, creative writing, crafts, photography, digital arts) for school-age and after-school participation, free or low-cost for low-income families, with talent-identification pathways. Paired with El Sistema (C.77) and the sports program (C.76), the renovated Child Institute network would run three coordinated child-development tracks under one roof.

Year-round cultural-venue activation and a tax-relief sponsorship model. An ambitious complement would be a program to promote cultural expressions all year round across Caracas's and the state capitals' major venues — in Caracas, El Poliedro, the Teatro Teresa Carreño, the Museo de Bellas Artes / Museo de Arte Contemporáneo and other museums, the Sala Rómulo Gallegos, the Anfiteatro de Petare, the Concha Acústica de Bello Monte, the Nuevo Circo, Parque Los

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Caobos, the Paseo Los Próceres, and a reconverted La Carlota airport (cf. its post-transition civic-use potential), plus the principal venues of the main state capitals. The financing mechanism could be a structured sponsorship-for-tax-relief scheme: show promoters and corporate sponsors finance popular, accessible events (concerts, festivals, theater, dance, exhibitions) in exchange for a tax credit, with the sponsor free to choose any beneficiary from a published list of certified cultural entities (orchestras, theater companies, museums, folkloric schools, festival cofradías). Crucially, for show promoters and entertainment entrepreneurs the tax credit earned by financing these accessible cultural events could be applied against the tax liability of the other, commercially profitable events they stage — so underwriting public-access culture directly lowers the tax bill on their for-profit programming, turning the scheme into a standing commercial incentive rather than a one-off donation. Certifying the cultural entities and letting sponsors pick from the list keeps the subsidy transparent, channels private money into culture while lowering state disbursement, and avoids the clientelar capture that defined the prior model. Calibrated with the heritage-preservation, festivals (C.75 popular-festivals program), and tourism tracks, year-round programming turns idle public venues into civic and economic assets and broadens cultural access well beyond the capital.

National Spiritual Reunification — Toward a Papal Visit by Pope Leo XIV

A spiritual dimension could complement the cultural-reunification effort. Miranda Institute's view is that the transition government — working through the Venezuelan Episcopal Conference (CEV) and the country's Catholic authorities — could lobby the Holy See to invite Pope Leo XIV to make an apostolic visit to Venezuela. In a nation where the Catholic Church retained moral authority and credibility through the years of conflict, a papal visit would offer a rare moment of national spiritual renewal and a unifying occasion that transcends political division — a bath of spirituality capable of helping a fractured society feel, however briefly, reunited and whole. Sequenced with the national-reconciliation and truth-commission tracks (C.42) and the cultural-reunification priorities (C.75), such a visit could carry symbolic weight no state ceremony could match. The initiative would be diplomatic and pastoral rather than fiscal, requiring coordination between the CEV, the transition's foreign ministry, and the Vatican, and would be most powerful if timed to a milestone of the democratic transition.

The spiritual-reunification effort need not be confined to the Catholic Church or to a single papal occasion. In parallel, the transition could convene the country's religious leaders across confessions — Catholic bishops and priests, evangelical and Protestant pastors, and the Jewish, Muslim, Orthodox and other faith and values-based communities — in a shared moral appeal to the nation. Working from the pulpit, the airwaves and the community, this ecumenical coalition could call citizens back to the civic and ethical values that two decades of crisis eroded: rejecting bribery, theft, intolerance and indifference, and affirming in their place national unity, assistance to one's neighbor, the closeness and integrity of the family, honesty in public and private life, and respect for the rights of others. Framed as moral and pastoral rather than partisan or fiscal, such a cross-denominational compact could reach into homes, parishes and neighborhoods that no government program reaches, reinforcing the reconciliation, truth-commission and civic-education tracks (C.42; C.43) and helping rebuild the social trust on which every other reform in this Agenda ultimately depends.

Sports Development

A nationwide sports development program could expand access, strengthen infrastructure, and build a sustainable talent pipeline by integrating school-based athletics, community clubs, and regional training centers. The centerpiece would be the rehabilitation and full activation of sports installations within primary and high schools across Venezuela — gymnasiums, courts, fields, and pools that exist as physical assets but are underused or degraded. These facilities could be reopened to the surrounding community after class schedule, transforming each school into a neighborhood sports hub — multiplying access at near-zero marginal infrastructure cost, recovering stranded assets, and reconnecting schools with their communities. A parallel rehabilitation track could restore the youth sports installations previously administered by the

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National Child Institute (INAM / IDENA legacy network) — community sports fields, multi-use courts, and recreation facilities historically distributed across residential neighborhoods. These installations were originally designed to bring sports infrastructure within walking distance of working-class residential areas; their rehabilitation under the renovated National Child Institute framework (C.75) would close the access gap in dense urban zones where school-based installations alone do not cover the population, and would form the residential-proximity layer of the broader sports-development network. The talent pipeline could identify and support talent from early ages through a structured pathway to high-performance programs, with targeted investment in priority sports to improve international competitiveness. Coach training and certification would establish transparent governance standards across federations. Funding could be hybrid (public resources, private sponsorship, and international partnerships with IOC, FIFA, and regional federations). Athlete support services would cover nutrition, sports medicine, education, and career transition. For outstanding athletes from low-income families, the program could provide scholarships and stipends that also help cover the athlete's family needs — so that a talented young athlete is not forced to abandon training to support the household; the stipend recognizes that, in low-income families, a gifted child is often also a needed earner, and removes that economic pressure as a barrier to high-performance development. Expanded participation in regional and global competitions could enhance exposure and performance benchmarks.

Delivery could lean on alliances with proven organizations rather than new bureaucracies. The reference case is Criollitos de Venezuela — the private nonprofit founded in 1962 by Luis "Mono" Zuloaga and Dr. José Del Vecchio, formed on an explicit citizen-formation philosophy ("we use baseball to form good citizens") and long the country's premier minor-baseball pipeline, with chapters nationwide; the La Guaira chapter alone counts ≈1,200 enrolled children (the national figure is being re-verified). The state could contract organizations of this record as operating partners for school and community leagues — per-child funding, facility access, coach certification, published enrollment — replicating the model across disciplines. The earthquake gives it urgency: Criollitos' La Guaira base was devastated June 24, with ≈100 young players — mostly semillero four- and five-year-olds — reported dead; rebuilding that chapter with the organization as partner would be at once sports policy and recovery.

National Youth Orchestra System — El Sistema

A plan to install a chapter of El Sistema in each large public elementary and secondary school across Venezuela, restoring music education as a structural component of the public-school curriculum and expanding the social reach of the program beyond its current urban nucleus. The program would cover both classical/academic music (orchestral and choral training in the original El Sistema tradition) and Venezuelan national/traditional musical expressions — joropo and the cuatro, gaita zuliana, tambores (Afro-Venezuelan drumming), música llanera, calypso de El Callao, and the regional folk repertoires — so that the system cultivates both the universal canon and the country's own living musical heritage, treating traditional music as a co-equal track rather than a secondary add-on. Instrument-making and folk-ensemble pathways would sit alongside the orchestral ones.

Vargas State

The June 24 earthquake exposed a structural governance gap in the hardest-hit state: La Guaira (the former Vargas) is the only Venezuelan state with a single municipality — one mayoralty (Municipio Vargas, eleven civil parishes, ≈1,497 km², ≈487,000 inhabitants per the 2023 estimate) for the entire coastal strip from Carayaca to Chuspa — which concentrated the local emergency response in a single overwhelmed municipal government while devastated communities from Catia La Mar to Caraballeda and Naiguatá had no local authority of their own. A transition government could retake the long-pending duty of municipalizing the state, a subdivision civil society and academic proposals have urged for years (proposals to split the state into two or three municipalities predate the disaster). Two new municipalities could be created alongside the existing one, and could carry the names of the state's two most beloved artistic sons: Armando Reverón (the

Macuto painter whose Castillete is the state's cultural landmark) for the eastern coastal corridor, and Pedro Elías Gutiérrez (the guaireño composer of *Alma Llanera*) for the western corridor — giving each zone an elected mayor, a municipal council, and its own civil-protection capacity ahead of the reconstruction decade.

The state's name is the companion measure: the 2019 renaming of Vargas State to "La Guaira" was approved by the state Legislative Council without a referendum and was criticized by civil society for erasing the only state named for a civilian — José María Vargas, the physician who was Venezuela's first non-military president. A transition-era state constitutional reform could return the state to its traditional name, restoring the Vargas designation by the consultative route (referendum) the 2019 change skipped, while keeping "La Guaira" as the historic capital's name. Both measures would be enacted through the state Legislative Council and the municipal-creation procedure of the LOPPM (Ley Orgánica del Poder Público Municipal), sequenced with the post-quake reconstruction so the new municipalities are born with the housing, habitability, and infrastructure tracks (the Transition (Applying for Multilateral Credit Facilities), Preserving Monómeros, Earthquake Recovery) already assigned to accountable local governments. Sources: Wikipedia/Gaceta Oficial · EcuRed.

La Carlota

The Generalísimo Francisco de Miranda Air Base (La Carlota) — a ≈100-hectare military airfield in the heart of eastern Caracas, surrounded by dense urban districts — could be eliminated as a regular city airport and converted into a large metropolitan park for sports and open-air entertainment, while retaining a single runway/helipad facility reserved for emergency, medical-evacuation, disaster-response, and catastrophe use. Caracas has very little green and recreational space per capita, and La Carlota is the largest contiguous open tract in the metropolitan core; its conversion (a long-discussed civic proposal) would create a signature public park — sports fields, courts, running and cycling circuits, open-air concert and event venues, and family recreation — linking naturally to the year-round cultural-venues program (C.75) and the sports-development network (C.76). Retaining a protected emergency-landing strip preserves the strategic capability (air ambulance, disaster relief, civil-protection staging) that a dense, seismically-exposed capital needs, without sustaining routine military/aviation operations over the city. The conversion would require demilitarization of the site, an environmental and urban-design master plan, and a transparent governance model (a public park authority, potentially with concessioned sports/entertainment operators). The plan could also anchor a modern convention and exhibition center within the park — a venue for international summits, trade fairs, energy and investment forums, and cultural events — positioning Caracas to showcase Venezuela as a business and investment hub for the Americas as the reopening matures; co-located with the emergency airstrip and the recreational grounds, it would pair civic amenity with an economic-diplomacy asset. It is a high-visibility quality-of-life signal of the transition's civic priorities.

Update-Disclosure Log — Internal Follow-Up Tracker

Records where live developments (Sections 02, 03, 05, 06) supersede or qualify forward-looking Section 04 material, so the team can track Phase III items migrating into live status. Conditional framing stays in Section 04; live treatment lives in the cited sections. This log is the in-document counterpart of the curator binnacle report.

- July 27 cycle — Budget Law & Public-Funds Oversight (Budget & Public-Funds Oversight) — *Live precedent; monitor.* The CAF fund's EY/PwC control-and-audit architecture (prior Headlines) is a working instance of the independent-CPA oversight layer Budget Law & Public-Funds Oversight proposes for public funds; fold into the item's design discussion next structural pass. Sovereign & PDVSA Debt (Debt) — GL 5X moves the PDVSA 2020 milestone to August 4 (Active OFAC GL Inventory; §01 weekly analysis); no change to the restructuring architecture. Gold Reserve Recovery (UK) (Gold/Assets) — the $346M IMF own-resources release (prior Headlines) is the first materially sized sovereign-asset unlocking; the restricted-use FGDF-style architecture question now has the FAQ 1263 precedent (relief flows exempted from FGDF) to weigh.

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- June data refresh (post-May close) — 01.1 indicators updated: oil exports revised to the May read (≈779 kb/d, Reuters/PDVSA docs; the Kpler April 1.23 mb/d figure flagged as a methodology difference rather than a same-basis comparison); CPI shifted to the BCV monthly series (Apr 10.6%, decelerating, single-digit projected from May) with the 612% figure retained as the 12-month accumulated; production reframed to the ≈1.2 mb/d 2026 estimate pending the mid-June OPEC May MOMR. New Item 02.23 added (BCV single-digit-inflation projection, FX-intervention firepower ≈$1,350M for May, region-leading growth projections with base-effect caveat). Comparative-data inflation row updated. End-May bond/EMBI prints still pending (n/c). GL 5W confirmed effective June 19, 2026.

- 07.7 (Debt & Restitution) — *Superseded-in-part.* Live restructuring narrative (May 13 launch; Centerview/Pigasse over Rothschild; GL 58; PDVSA 2020 validity ruling; June DSA target) moved to the Democracy agenda (Sovereign & PDVSA Debt); 07.7 rewritten to the forward restitution architecture; debt stack updated (≈$32B sovereign / $32B PDVSA / $17B arrears / $16B expropriation-ICSID / $10B China / $4B Russia). *Follow-up:* re-scope to execution stage once a second OFAC license authorizes direct creditor negotiation.

- 07.1 (Multilateral Re-engagement) — *Current; monitor.* IMF Article IV resumption (Apr 16), $4.9B/SDR 3.6B reserve tranche, WB Cordeiro Guerra mission (May 13–16) reflected in Item PDVSA Files ICC Arbitration Over Jamaica's Petrojam Seizure Jamaica. *Follow-up:* watch for a formal IMF financing request.

- Gold Reserve Recovery (UK) (Gold Reserve Recovery, UK) — *Relocated.* Moved back from the Transition (Applying for Multilateral Credit Facilities) to the Democracy agenda this cycle after the legitimate-TSJ custody request stabilized the file; valuation updated to >$4B at current gold prices. *Follow-up:* watch for any UK response to the July 8 letter or a Treasury-brokered restricted-use scheme.

- Price Liberalization, Subsidy Reform & Tariff Review / Labor Law Reform, Salary Adjustments & Public-Payroll Rebalancing (Price liberalization / housing affordability) — *Partially anticipated by live events.* The July 11 rental-law reform announcement (prior Headlines) begins the tenancy-regime liberalization Section 04 contemplated; conditional treatment stays here, live coverage in Headlines and the Transition (Preserving Monómeros). *Follow-up:* track the reform text and Gaceta publication.

- National Served-Water & Wastewater Systems (Served-water system) — *Re-scoped.* Rewritten this cycle from a maintenance note to a sequenced rehabilitation program (audit → emergency tranche → continuity → potability → losses → restructuring → financing), folding in the post-quake seven-state network failure.

- Binational & Multilateral Agreements Review 1999–2026 (Binational & Multilateral Agreements Review / OPEC analysis) — *Expanded.* The OPEC-exit diplomatic column gained the empirical 2026 record (earthquake-aid absence, modest Arab trade, no Middle East diaspora, non-recognition pattern during the Guaidó/González episodes); live coverage of the ICC campaign that touches the international-justice assumptions sits at prior Headlines. *Follow-up:* track whether the U.S. anti-ICC campaign alters the Venezuela I probe's practical status.

- National Statistics (Multilateral Re-engagement) — *Removed this cycle* per curator direction; the live multilateral track is carried in the Democracy agenda (Sovereign & PDVSA Debt) (arrears/re-engagement) and the Headlines record.

- National Served-Water & Wastewater Systems (Served-water system) — *Re-scoped again:* the wastewater/sanitation side added as step (6) and the title extended accordingly.

- 07.45 / 07.47 (Elections / CNE) — *Current; monitor.* Machado's May 23 Panama declaration and the Manifiesto de Panamá (May 28) carried in Items 02.23 and 02.24; polling in 02.25. *Follow-up:* migrate 07.47 operational elements to a live section if a CNE redesignation occurs.

- Oil export shift — *New live data.* The May export read (≈779 kb/d; China #1) and PDVSA Boscan self-export now live in 01.1 and Section 06.1 (the former standalone export item 02.20 was retired this cycle). *Follow-up:* revisit the oil-revenue baseline if licensing posture changes.

- Section 07 deceased entries — *Removed section-wide* this cycle (extending the prior 08.2.1 removal to all of Section 07): Flores Suárez and Raúl Morodo rows deleted, the GAESA beneficial-owner parenthetical and the Rangel Vale research-note de-flagged, legend deceased-marker clause dropped. Estates/co-defendants/successor entities carry any live proceeding. Francisco Ameliach added (verified OFAC E.O. 13692 designation).

- June cycle structural/editorial — Section 07 (Comparative Data) moved to position 03; all section numbers, item numbers, and cross-references remapped. All body bold stripped (curator re-applies manually). Document-wide medium compression with outlet-level source links; per-item ceiling ≈1 page.

- Section 07 expansion (this cycle) — Added to Group A: Elvis Amoroso (CNE president; OFAC/EU/UK/Canada) and Jorge Rodríguez (AN president, ex-CNE president 2006–08; OFAC), plus a CNE board-lineage reference note. Added to Group D the PDVSA-bribery money-laundering cluster Luis Carlos De León, César Rincón Godoy, and Alejandro Istúriz Chiesa (DOJ S.D. Texas; De León/Reiter also OFAC sm594). Moved Calixto José Ortega Sánchez from the judiciary cluster (Group C) to Group F — he is a monetary-authority official (BCV VP/IMF Governor), not a magistrate. Relocated the FARC-dissident/ELN block (former Group J) from 08.2.1 to the Colombia subsection on a Colombian-origin / Venezuela-nexus basis. Routed to awaiting-verification (no qualifying primary-source designation found): the Aboud network and Jesse Chacón. Standing sourcing note reaffirmed: Armando.info and Transparencia Venezuela are reliable secondary sources to cite where they surface dark-record information, unless they name the original source.

- Section 07 restructure (late-June cycle) — Merged the former standalone 08.2.3 (Spain / Audiencia Nacional) into the regional accountability section, now a single 08.2.3 with five numbered country subsections (08.2.3.1 Argentina · .2 Ecuador · .3 Colombia, incl. the relocated FARC/ELN block · .4 Brazil · .5 Spain/AN with the full Plus Ultra–Zapatero–Koldo table). Added CNE figure José Luis Gutiérrez Parra (OFAC sm1115, Sept 2020) and expanded the CNE board-lineage note with verified designations; confirmed Jorge Rodríguez remains on the SDN list after the April 1, 2026 Delcy-only delisting; removed a duplicate Ameliach row. Tibisay Lucena (ex-CNE president; sanctioned) excluded under the deceased rule (died 2023). Edmundo González's May 30 renunciation of his president-elect claim added to Item 02.23.

- Registry extracted (late-June cycle) — The entire Regional Accountability & Due-Diligence Registry (former 08.2) has been removed from this bulletin and moved to a separate, de-branded, confidential standalone document ("for your eyes only," not for reproduction, confirm against original sources). Section 07 here now contains only the Sanctions Architecture (07.1) and is retitled accordingly. In the standalone doc: Group G (Detained/Politically-Constrained) and Group H (Officials Outside Venezuela) were removed; Miguel Rodríguez Torres consolidated into Group B with his dual-condition profile highlighted; TdA re-lettered Group G; the regional section retitled "Latam & Spain." Cross-references in this bulletin that pointed into the old registry now point to "the separate confidential Accountability Registry."

Feedback

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